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ABSTRACT
In this Article, I argue that some truths about our constitutional order are
best left misunderstood. I do so by defending a self-deception at the core of our
discourse on constitutionalism. We tend to speak as if our constitutional system rests upon an uncompromising inquiry into constitutional meaning. Yet
all viable interpretive theories privilege some concerns above such meaning,
however they define it. This paradox, I argue, arises from the tension between
parallel constitutional commitments to Enlightenment thought and the common law tradition. The paradox preserves, in my view, an appearance of coherence that is as vital as it is false. In elevating an Enlightenment ideal that
belies our common law culture, we perpetuate a redemptive vision of constitutionalism capable of binding us together even as conflicts over constitutional
meaning drive us apart.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are convinced. You ascend Mount Sinai and behold
a vision of constitutional truth. It is not a vision of constitutional
commandments; earlier pilgrims to Sinai etched the commandments
of American government into the written Constitution. Here on Sinai, those pilgrims divined the true constitutional text. At the same
spot, you behold something different: the intricacies of constitutional practice, past and present. If those past pilgrims followed in Mo1
ses’s footsteps as transcriber of the Ten Commandments, you follow
2
in his footsteps as transcriber of the Torah. At least, you will if you
share your vision with the public.

1

2

This reference, of course, is to Moses’s ascent to Mount Sinai. There, God “gave unto
Moses . . . two tables of testimony, tables of stone, written with the finger of God.” Exodus
31:18 (King James).
Rabbinic scholars have long held that Moses transcribed the first five books of the Torah
through divine inspiration atop Mount Sinai. See RICHARD ELLIOTT FRIEDMAN, WHO
WROTE THE BIBLE? 17–32 (1987).
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The parallel with the Torah betrays both the promise and the limits of your vision on Sinai. You perceive every detail that circumscribes the Constitution, from the intentions of the Framers, to the
thinking of individual judges, to the evolving preferences of the citizenry. For you, what was once unknowable becomes knowable. You
may assess empirical claims about the facts now available to you, and
you may assess the fidelity of theories that transform those facts into
3
constructions of constitutional meaning. Yet your vision cannot ensure interpretive agreement as to constitutional meaning. Sinai does
4
not somehow provide a constitutional “view from nowhere.” The
Constitution contains no commandment specifying how it is to be interpreted, and even if it did, that commandment would require in5
terpretation. Your vision might make a theory more attractive than
6
others, but it cannot settle ultimate questions of meaning.
Still, revelation yields possibility. Suppose you return from Sinai
and perceive that our contemporary constitutional order is rife with
falsehood and misunderstanding. Some people purposefully misrepresent constitutional truth in order to reach certain outcomes. Others fail to see what they miscomprehend. Falsehoods and misunderstanding both create and obscure inconsistencies within interpretive
accounts of constitutional meaning. That is, suppose the people fail
to arrive at the constitutional meaning dictated by different interpretive approaches because they miscomprehend the sources underlying
that meaning. Here lies the possibility. Perhaps, the people will
heed your newfound wisdom and eliminate the falsehoods and incongruities that pervade our constitutional order. What do you tell
them? Do you follow Moses and share the truth?
This may seem like an odd set of questions. Of course you share
the truth—or so holds conventional wisdom. Falsehood and misun3

4

5

6

In this Article, the term “constitutional truth” refers to empirical facts relevant to constitutional interpretation. By contrast, the term “constitutional meaning” refers to the conclusions drawn from empirical facts through the act of interpretation. For further discussion on the distinction between empirical fact and interpretive conclusions from the
perspective of Mount Sinai, see infra Part I.A.3.
In his “View From Nowhere,” Thomas Nagel sought to “combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and
his viewpoint included.” THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 3 (1986).
Notably, however, the Constitution does contain language addressing how it should not
be interpreted. The Ninth Amendment provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
For the same reason, only the original constitutional text can become apparent on Sinai.
To recognize subsequent alterations to the text requires a theory of interpretation as to
their legitimacy.
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derstanding threaten to distort the true meaning of our constitutional commandments. Fidelity to those commandments, however, conceived interpretively, is the overarching project of constitutionalism.
Constitutional theorists labor to unearth truth about our constitutional system in order to perfect the fidelity of practice. Litigants labor to reveal the truth of constitutional meaning, even if that truth
has long been hidden from the courts. Judges parse the legal interpretations presented by litigants with an eye for the truth. Or, so the
narrative goes. We seek coherence in law and rue misunderstandings
that allow inconsistencies to persist. The course for you, then, is
clear: speak and be thorough.
I will push back against this conventional wisdom. I hope to convince you to proceed from Sinai with trepidation. As you descend
from Sinai, I argue, you should think about what should be spoken
and what should remain unspoken.
Rather than delve into how you might address particular revelations uncovered on Sinai, I take aim at the conventional wisdom itself. I contend that the notion that we must share our visions from
Sinai is a valuable self-deception at the core of our constitutional order. This argument combines a descriptive claim with a normative
one. Descriptively, I argue that our constitutional order does not
share the conventional view’s unwavering disdain for falsehood and
inconsistency. Normatively, I argue that our acceptance of falsehood
and inconsistency is vital to the survival of that order. From this, it
follows that there is at least one truth visible from Sinai that would
best remain unspoken.
The descriptive argument develops a dichotomy between two polar elements present in our constitutional order: the common law
culture and the Enlightenment ideal. Born of the Enlightenment,
our constitutional system carries forward a tradition steeped in the
notion that we may reason to an understanding of abstract political
truth. In this vein, we view the Constitution as an instrument of truth
that eschews the falsehood and inconsistency that afflicted prior political orders. Yet, while the Constitution may have been born in a
time of enlightenment, it was also born within a common law tradition. That tradition is not impervious to conceptual order and the
dictates of abstract reason, but in many ways it actively preserves the
mythology and disjunction decried by Enlightenment thought. We
speak of the Constitution as an Enlightenment project, yet we practice constitutionalism in a manner antithetical to the Enlightenment
tenets we espouse. This contradiction persistently evades recognition.
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The normative argument defends this state of affairs. In isolation,
neither the common law culture nor the Enlightenment ideal adequately advances our collective constitutional goals. Accordingly, we
face a choice of either setting boundaries between these two strands
of constitutional thought and preserving a state of either latent or
overt contradiction between them. I argue that no satisfying and
precise boundaries exist between the common law culture and the
Enlightenment ideal, a claim to which our constitutional discourse
can readily attest. Recognizing the present state of contradiction between the common law culture and the Enlightenment ideal, moreover, would threaten the stability of our constitutional order. A state
of latent contradiction, by contrast, would maintain an appearance of
order and principle within our constitutional system that is, in my
view, vital to its preservation. On Sinai, then, you should refrain from
exposing the mythic quality of the Enlightenment ideal.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I develops a typology of the
mythology and disjunction that you might discern on Sinai. Part II
introduces the Enlightenment ideal through the lens of mythology
and disjunction. Part III discusses how our common law culture undermines the Enlightenment ideal, again through the lens of mythology and disjunction. Part IV discusses how scholars have navigated the tension between the common law culture and the
Enlightenment ideal. Part V defends the Enlightenment ideal as a
beneficial legal myth opposed to mythology and disjunction. I conclude with a return to the questions you face atop Mount Sinai.

I. MYTHOLOGY AND DISJUNCTION

All theories of constitutional interpretation take facts and pass
them through an interpretive mechanism to discern constitutional
meaning. I employ the term mythology to capture misstatements of
the facts that underlie theories of constitutional meaning. I employ
the term disjunction to capture inconsistencies between those facts
and the conclusions of law advanced by a constitutional theory. In a
broad sense, then, mythology connotes fantastical notions about what
I have called constitutional truth. Disjunction, by contrast, describes
interpretive inconsistency that arises from mythology. As we will see,
all theories of constitutional interpretation must develop a theory of
the acceptability of mythology and disjunction. Your task on Sinai is
to develop such a theory.
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A. The Mythology of Law
Few legal scholars have sought to define mythology precisely. The
term is often applied to both seemingly objective untruths and to
highly contested interpretive claims. Although scholars in other
fields have spent considerable energy on conceptualizing myth, they
have not advanced a uniform view. I do not seek to present a novel
account of the meaning of mythology, but rather to distinguish between understandings invoked elsewhere. For our purposes, I distinguish between three types of myths, which I call constitutive myths,
legal fictions, and legal myths.
1. Constitutive Myths
Constitutive myths establish the collective cultural meaning of a
social order. In Robert Cover’s terms, constitutive myths generate
7
nomoi. They produce normative meaning “in the history of ordinary
legal doctrine at work in mundane affairs; in utopian and messianic
yearnings, imaginary shapes given to a less resistant reality; in apologies for power and privilege and in the critiques that may be leveled
8
at the justificatory enterprises of law.” These myths constitute society
through narrative. They bind us into a collective consciousness and
divide us into distinct communities of meaning.
This notion of constitutive myth stretches more broadly than
many traditional notions of myths applied to folklore. Scholars have
often cast myth as a narrative that generates meaning. As Ernest Cassirer writes, myth is “the art of expressing, and that means of organiz9
ing, [man’s] most deeply rooted instincts, his hopes and fears.” Yet
the distinguishing feature of myth in many accounts rests in its fantas10
tical quality. It is an illusion of the mind, a primordial story of a
11
12
time before time, a phantasmagoria. Such accounts return, time
7

8
9
10

11

12

Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (defining a nomos as a “normative universe” that defines what is “right
and wrong,” “lawful and unlawful,” and “valid and void”).
Id. at 9.
ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 48 (1946).
MAX MULLER, LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE 21 (N.Y., Charles Scribner 1862)
(describing mythology as “the bane of the ancient world” and a “disease of language” that
only assumes meaning in the mind).
MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY 5–6 (Willard R. Trask trans., 1963) (“Myth narrates a
sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of
the ‘beginnings.’”).
CASSIRER, supra note 9, at 23 (“As these beliefs are in open contradiction to our senseexperience and as there exist no physical objects that correspond to the mythical representations it follows that myth is a mere phantasmagoria.”).
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and again, to some notion of truth. Mythology, the reasoning goes,
13
departs from the truth of our objective reality. In so doing, it may
either propagate dangerous falsehood or promote a transcendent
truth.
In the sense described here, by contrast, a constitutive myth has
no necessary relationship with an external reality or truth. The distinguishing feature of a constitutive myth rests in its shared significance for a social group. Constitutive myths, therefore, may be firmly
14
rooted in fantasy or firmly rooted in reality. The distinction between historical narrative and constitutive myth is a blurred one. History may be regarded as constitutive myth when it is canonized as a
source of shared cultural meaning. At such point, the narrative’s basis in historical reality becomes less important than the significance
15
we ascribe to it. Of course, as historical narrative takes on this role,
its historical roots may become more tenuous over time. Yet fidelity
may be just as constitutive as infidelity.
Given that constitutive myths generate conceptions of truth, it
may seem incongruous to place them within a typology of charges of
misunderstanding. As we will see, legal fictions and legal myths challenge constitutive myths against an external notion of truth. That is,
constitutive myths represent the challenged misunderstandings. In a
world unconcerned with external measures of truth, however, constitutive myths represent the only relevant baseline against which to level charges of misunderstanding. Rather than assert that a given understanding misstates truth in some fundamental sense, we would
assert that said understanding misstates our shared system of meaning. To misunderstand would be to subscribe to constitutive mythology not shared by the public.
Consider a few examples of prevailing constitutive myths. The
most obvious relate to the Founding. The Founding breathes life into present visions of America as a social contract, a republican experiment, a bastion of equality. The same narratives flow through our
understanding of Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement.
13

14

15

For a statement to this effect in legal scholarship, see Arthur S. Miller, Myth and Reality in
American Constitutionalism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 181, 206 (1984) (reviewing DON PRICE,
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:
SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND POLITICAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1983) and HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF
TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983)).
As Rollo May writes, a “myth is a way of making sense in a senseless world. Myths are narrative patterns that give significance to our existence.” ROLLO MAY, THE CRY FOR MYTH
15 (1991).
Recently, Chiara Bottici has highlighted this notion among longstanding accounts of
myth. See CHIARA BOTTICI, A PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL MYTH 179 (2007).
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They also set the boundaries of the canons of admirable (and deplor16
able) sources invoked to establish meaning. It is not hard to challenge the historical integrity of such narratives. Yet these narratives
represent important pillars of our social understanding.
2. Legal Fictions
Legal fictions denote socially recognized distortions of empirical
fact employed to manipulate legal meaning. Although the notion of
legal fiction has a rich history in the law, scholars have struggled to
reach a consensus as to its meaning. They generally agree that legal
fictions are falsehoods introduced to evade results dictated by a formal notion of law. They also generally agree that these falsehoods
are a product of judicial creation, particularly in the common law
mold. The legal fiction, according to a recurrent trope, fosters the
law’s development “like a scaffolding . . . that . . . can be removed
17
with ease.” Falsehoods once necessary to achieve a result become
unnecessary with the advance of the law. Scholars disagree, however,
on two important dimensions.
First, they disagree as to the necessary visibility of the falsehood
underlying a legal fiction. For some, like Jeremy Bentham and Henry
Maine, the legal fiction actively deludes the public in order to legiti18
mate departures from the law. For others, like William Blackstone,
the legal fiction denotes an expedient falsehood that does not intend
19
to deceive but may nonetheless confuse. For still others, like Lon
Fuller and Roscoe Pound, the legal fiction can neither confuse nor

16

17
18

19

Constitutive myths define what is accepted in the canons of constitutional law, what is
rejected in those canons, and what remains a matter of dispute. See generally J.M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963,
968 (1998) (discussing what ought to be “canonical in the study of law”).
LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 70 (1967).
See JEREMY BENTHAM, Preface Intended for the Second Edition of the Fragment on Government, in
A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 509 (J.H. Burns &
H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) (defining fiction as “a wilful [sic] falsehood, having for its object
the stealing [of] legislative power, by and for hands, which could not, or durst not, openly
claim it,—and, but for the delusion thus produced, could not exercise it”); HENRY
SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND
ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 25 (N.Y., Henry Holt & Co. 1878) (defining legal fiction
“to signify any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law
has undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified”).
Blackstone implied that much of the power of the legal fiction lay in deception, which
harmed a government based on popular representation. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *267–68. He defined legal fiction as an arbitrary “expedient” more than
an instrument of deception, however. Id.

May 2013]

CONSTITUTIONAL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM

1381

deceive.20 The notion of legal fiction, then, has alternately described
both transparent and opaque falsehoods as well as falsehoods that
straddle the boundary between these poles.
Second, scholars disagree as to the type of falsehood that characterizes a legal fiction. This disagreement has been less fully explored
in the literature. For Bentham and Blackstone, falsehood denotes a
21
recognizable departure from empirical fact. For Pound, by contrast,
falsehood includes both distortions of empirical fact and distortions
22
of more theoretical concepts like equity and natural law. These approaches rely on a transcendent notion of truth. For Fuller, by contrast, the legal fiction denotes distortion of a collective notion of
truth rather than a transcendent one: if we all agree that a statement
23
is false, then it is false for purposes of labeling it a legal fiction.
In the sense described here, legal fictions follow Fuller and
Pound’s notion of transparency and Bentham and Blackstone’s notion of truth. Consider first the question of falsehood. Given its reliance on a collective notion of truth, Fuller’s notion of legal fiction
can best be described as a genre of constitutive myth: social meaning
derives from our simultaneous affirmation and denial of a statement
of truth. I employ the notion of legal fiction to assess constitutive mythology against a transcendent standard: your vision from Sinai. For
reasons I address in the succeeding Subpart, Sinai can only promise a
transcendent standard of empirical fact. Consider next the question
of visibility. I distinguish between recognized and unrecognized
falsehoods. I call the former legal fictions and the latter legal myths.
I discuss legal myths in the next Subpart.
This view of legal fiction has a few consequences that depart from
conventional views. First, legal fictions are not necessarily a product
20

21

22
23

See FULLER, supra note 17, at 9 (“A fiction is either (1) a statement propounded with a
complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.”); ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 131 (1923) (defining
fiction as an instance when a judge claims that “a sacred or authoritative text means what
it palpably did not mean or covers what no one had in mind when it was promulgated”).
Neither scholar made this point explicitly. Bentham described the legal fiction as “falsehood, the irreconcilable enemy of justice—falsehood, under the name of fiction—[that] is
passed off by [judges] upon the deluded people” for convenience. JEREMY BENTHAM,
THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 92 (John
Bowring ed., 1843). Blackstone described legal fictions as “minute contrivances” and
“circuities.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *268.
POUND, supra note 20, at 131 (identifying “the bolder and more general fictions of interpretation, equity and natural law”).
FULLER, supra note 17, at 11–12 (“A statement must be false before it can be a fiction. Its
falsity depends upon whether the words used are inaccurate as an expression of reality.
But the inaccuracy of a statement must be judged with reference to the standards of language usage.”).
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of judicial imagination. They may underlie decisions concerning legislative and even constitutional enactments. Second, we may collectively believe that a statement is a legal fiction even though it is not.
That is, we may be mistaken in our belief that a statement is false.
With these two caveats in mind, consider a few doctrines described with reference to legal fiction. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity has long been identified as rooted in false claims about the
24
intent of the framers of the Eleventh Amendment. The originalist
justification of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights has come under
similar assault as resting on false claims about the framers of the
25
Fourteenth Amendment. Each of these doctrines, of course, may be
justified on grounds other than original intent. Such justifications
would render the commonly asserted legal fictions irrelevant. Of
course, they would also raise the possibility of a different set of legal
fictions.
3. Legal Myths
Legal myths designate unrecognized distortions of empirical fact
that underlie legal meaning. A legal myth is identical to a legal fiction except in that it goes unnoticed. The notion of opaque falsehood has been more scantly theorized in legal literature than the notion of transparent falsehood. Literature on legal fictions straddles
this divide, but the view that legal fictions must be visible is fairly
26
standard. Scholars typically use myth as a generic term to designate
27
a broad notion of misunderstanding. This common usage denotes
as myth misunderstandings of truth as the speaker defines it, whether
they be misunderstandings of empirical or theoretical claims.
Empirical claims can be assessed definitively given adequate observational tools. Of course, tools are seldom adequate. What you
are thinking right now is an empirical question, but the rest of us do
not have a tool that can reveal it definitively. Where you were born,
by contrast, is a question that we can determine through historical

24

25
26
27

See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1988) (“The Eleventh Amendment . . . has long been perceived
as a doctrinal abyss, replete with the inconsistencies borne of pragmatic adjustments to
the principle for which it supposedly stands.”).
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
But see Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2007) (describing both
patent and latent falsehoods as legal fictions).
See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 704–05 (1974)
(describing the application of the Erie doctrine to the Federal Arbitration Act).
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records.28 It is important to note that answers to empirical questions
like these must inhabit a broader normative context. Consider the
question of where you were born. To answer this, we must know who
you are, what it is to be in a place, what it is to be born, and so on. In
the abstract, these questions demand deeply theoretical answers.
Within a normative context, however, their answers are an accepted
element of social meaning. Those answers are also sufficiently specif29
ic to allow us to test observations against fixed points.
Theoretical claims, by contrast, cannot be definitively assessed, regardless of the available observational tools. Let us distinguish between two types of theoretical claims. First, there are claims that concern imprecisely defined elements of a normative context. Consider
the claim that you are a just person. Our social structure may espouse a notion of what it means to be a just person, but that notion is
not specific enough to allow us to assess definitively whether you
meet it. Second, there are claims that concern what a normative context should look like. Consider the claim that justice requires that all
people have computers. This claim is intelligible given that it occupies a normative structure; otherwise, we could not communicate the
idea of justice, the idea of computers, and so on. The claim itself,
however, seeks to define normative meaning rather than assess com30
pliance with it. Each claim yields debate rather than measurement.
The notion of falsehood underlying legal myth—and legal fiction—refers to distortions of empirical claims but not distortions of
theoretical claims. You arrive on Sinai as an occupant of a distinct
normative context, that of modern American society. Your vision illuminates facts within that context with tools beyond our technological powers. Like no other American, you see the historical record,

28
29

30

Of course, this assumes that there are reliable historical records, witnesses to the birth,
and so on.
My aim here is not to make any deep epistemological claims about the viability of empiricism as a manner of seeking truth. Rather, I seek to capture an aspiration of our constitutional discourse to nail down certain “facts” as a precondition to addressing questions
of interpretation that cannot solely be resolved with reference to these supposed facts. A
recurring critique of constitutional theory charges that theorists jump to the questions
that elude pure factual resolution without adequately engaging the empirical questions
capable of such resolution. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).
As these distinctions should make clear, the line between empirical claims and theoretical
claims is more slippery than often acknowledged. For purposes of this Article, however,
we need not parse this boundary further. Suffice it to say, the view from Sinai makes clear
which views are based in empirical fact. As we abandon the abstraction of Sinai, suffice it
to say that within a normative context, the line between theoretical and empirical claims
about constitutional interpretation is usually quite evident.
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social views of morality, and the intricacies of modern practice. These empirical facts deepen the enterprise of constitutional interpretation. The enterprise of interpretation, however, is theoretical; it is
the task of defining normative meaning in our legal system. If we include such theoretical disagreement within our notion of falsehood,
legal myth—and legal fiction—will blend into the notion of constitutive mythology. To assert falsehood would be to criticize a constitutive myth rather than to reveal its departure from an accepted notion
of reality.
For our purposes, then, a legal myth is a misstatement of fact that
is not apparent to the speaker. Given the absence of tools to verify
every fact circumscribing our legal order, scholars are often at odds
about what constitutes a legal myth. Consider Bruce Ackerman’s
claim that the notion that the Constitution only provides for amendment through Article V is a myth. This is a theoretical claim as to
constitutional meaning and thus falls outside our definition of legal
myth. Ackerman arrives at this theoretical conclusion, however, from
the view that scholars have misrepresented historical reality concern31
ing the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal. In our terms,
Ackerman asserts that these scholars subscribe to legal myths. Other
scholars dispute Ackerman’s revisionist history; in our terms, they
32
claim that he is advancing legal myths.
B. Disjunction and the Law
Scholars have devoted less energy to theorizing about disjunction
than they have to theorizing about mythology. Nonetheless, concerns about disjunction animate all fields of academic discourse. By
disjunction, I mean discontinuity in the relationship between com33
ponents of a theoretical construct. A disjunction is present when an
interpretive output does not follow from interpretive inputs as demanded by a theory of interpretation. In legal discourse, disjunction
denotes an instance where our conclusions of positive law fail to follow from empirical fact in accordance with the requirements set out
31
32

33

See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34–57 (1991) (describing his
constitutional theory as a rejection of the “Bicentennial Myth”).
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT.
115, 115–16 (1994) (challenging Ackerman’s theory as rooted in a myth about the period
between the end of Reconstruction and Brown v. Bd. of Educ.).
Scholars have used this term loosely to designate a disconnection or incongruity. See, e.g.,
PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
MIND 9–12 (1996). Here, I wish to use it in a more particularized way about the internal
logic of a constitutional theory.
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by a theory of interpretation. We most often speak about three types
of disjunction in constitutional theory: those between law and history, law and morality, and law and practice.
1. Law and History
Historical inquiry rests at the core of an order built on the notion
of a founding document. To discern the meaning of that document,
we delve into historical moments that circumscribe it. History serves
as a guide for how to treat history: interpretations of the Founding
inform views of how to treat the historical moments that succeed it.
Your vision on Sinai illuminates these historical moments, but it cannot tell you how they relate to one another to generate constitutional
meaning. That is the task that confronts the constitutional theorist.
She must elucidate an interpretive framework that explains how historical occurrences shape legal meaning, if they do at all. Constitutional interpretation, then, requires a theory that relates history to
law.
Disjunctions between law and history denote instances where that
theory breaks down. A theory of legal interpretation, of course, may
allow for departures between law and history. Such departures do
not represent disjunctions. Rather, they represent conjunctions: the
theory allows the departure according to its internal metrics relating
history to law. A disjunction occurs when we fail to construe substantive legal meaning in accordance with those metrics. That is, disjunction occurs when our vision of the substantive law is not faithful to either the relevant historical record or the law’s interpretive guidelines.
Either we misapply the proper interpretive methodology, or we
properly apply that methodology to an inaccurate account of history.
A theory of interpretation could render disjunctions between law
and history impossible. If you believed law were a composite of history, the range of possible disjunctions would be a null set: there would
be no way law could depart from history. It is difficult to imagine
such a regime, however. You might believe that the law is a code
adopted at a particular moment to apply to eternity, but presumably
34
such a code could be misapplied. Alternatively, if you believed that
history was irrelevant to interpretation, it would make no sense to
speak of a disjunction between law and history. This regime may
seem more plausible than the previous one; perhaps the legal order

34

For example, we might say that a code adopted on Day Zero contains all relevant legal
rules and that those rules prohibit alteration and all non-formalist interpretation.
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could address every issue de novo. The very notion of constitutional35
ism, however, presumes some condition precedent based in history.
Accordingly, most, if not all, interpretive theories treat history as
instructive but not dispositive. History is relevant for law but law is
not history. Even the most ardent textualists look to historical usage
apart from the text itself, and even the most ardent anti-textualists in36
voke historical practice to advance apparent departures from text.
The most ardent originalists acknowledge that law flows from history
through interpretation; no component of history is equivalent to
37
law. The difficulty rests in synthesizing different historical elements
and moments in history to reach a legitimate legal outcome. It
should not be difficult to see the potential for disjunction that follows
from this task. Disjunction may appear in the open as we examine
history and the law. Or, it may hide beneath misunderstandings of
facts relevant to interpretation.
Assertions of disjunction between law and history abound in constitutional discourse. Consider, for example, debates about the
Court’s construction of substantive due process. In Roe v. Wade, the
majority asserted that the Due Process Clause protects rights that are
38
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” The
Court has not settled definitively on this standard, or any of its com39
petitors. In dissent, however, Justice Rehnquist did not quibble with
35

36

37

38
39

This is, of course, contestable. The natural rights theorist might posit that certain rights
are innate, and that the passage of time has no relation to their authority or legitimacy.
For most theorists, however, time is a vital concern. As Jed Rubenfeld argues, “[s]elfgovernment is achieved by committing oneself to certain ends and holding oneself to
those commitments over time. Human freedom is the freedom to write: to give one’s life
a text.” Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1145 (1995).
For the textualist view, consider, for example, Justice Black’s famous analysis of the Bill of
Rights. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960). Black defended
his view that there are absolutes in the Bill of Rights not by mere invocation of text; he invoked “[t]he whole history and background of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, as I
understand it.” Id. at 867. For the anti-textualist view, consider, for example, Jack Balkin’s critique of Raoul Berger’s originalist views. Balkin argued that “we have rejected
Berger’s history because we know that the meaning of the Constitution is essentially historical—that it is a meaning which works itself out through history.” J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 953–54 (1988) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)).
Consider once more Justice Black’s argument that there are absolutes in the Bill of
Rights, given history and text “as I understand it.” Black, supra note 36, at 867. Although
originalists like Black sought to cabin judicial discretion in the act of interpretation, they
do not claim to fully eliminate that discretion.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
The Court has also looked to the “penumbra” of the Constitution, Griswold v. Connecticut., 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), whether a right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history

May 2013]

CONSTITUTIONAL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM

1387

the majority’s standard. Rather, he asserted that the majority had distorted history and thereby misapplied the requirements of its stand40
ard. In so doing, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the majority advanced a disjunction between law and history.
2. Law and Morality
It is more controversial to assert that constitutional interpretation
contains a moral component. For some constitutional theorists, the
interpretive project is wholly historical. The originalist declares that
it is illegitimate to look beyond original intent. The living constitutionalist may speak in similar tones. The Constitution, she might say,
represents a living document precisely because it was so envisioned by
the Framers. Jack Balkin’s view of originalist living constitutionalism
41
ties these two strands in this fashion. So does Bruce Ackerman’s
theory of dualist democracy; the legitimacy of extra-textual amendment, says Ackerman, derives from the Founding view of revolution42
ary constitutionalism. Morality, for such views, is a consideration for
the political branches.
Led of late by Ronald Dworkin, scholars have contested the no43
tion that morality has no role in constitutional interpretation.
Dworkin places moral judgments at the core of the judicial task. This
does not mean that judges may read their own moral convictions into
the document. Rather, Dworkin argues that judges “must regard
themselves as partners with other officials, past and future, who to44
gether elaborate a coherent constitutional morality.” For Dworkin,
the task of constitutional interpretation involves two steps. First, the
interpreter must devise each possible constitutional theory that justi-

40
41

42

43

44

and tradition,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)), and international consensus, Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (viewing international law as instructive in combination with the standard identified in Glucksberg).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 174–77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
549, 549 (2009) (“Original meaning originalism and living constitutionalism are compatible positions. In fact, they are two sides of the same coin.”).
See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 165–67 (explaining that for the Founders, the “constitutional text inaugurates the American experiment in dualism by defining a higher lawmaking process through which future generations might concentrate their political energies to make fundamental law in the name of We the People of the United States”).
For a pair of other prominent, recent critiques of the notion that morality has no role to
play in interpretation, see generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 10,
30 (1980) and DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 23–31 (1977).
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 10 (1996).
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fies the settled principles of the prevailing constitutional scheme as a
45
whole. Second, the interpreter must “judge which of these eligible
46
readings makes the work in progress best, all things considered.”
The latter judgment must invoke morality, albeit subject to the con47
straints imposed by the political history of the community.
So stated, Dworkin’s theory depends on a notion of morality that
could not be characterized as definitively false. Moral claims are
hardly empirical; they are theoretical in the sense that they either (1)
invoke an imprecisely defined element of our normative structure, or
(2) call into question the proper contours of that structure. As
Dworkin defines the role of morality in interpretation, however, moral claims must be consistent with a specific standard: the moral views
of the constitutional community. Of course, the normative meaning
of collective intent is not sufficiently defined to allow us to test it
without additional theory. Once we define this concept, however, its
evaluation begins to look empirical. Suppose a theory stipulates that
collective intent only exists when a majority of citizens hold the belief
in question. With appropriate tools, this is a testable proposition that
would exclude many visions of morality.
It follows that invocations of morality may fall outside verifiable
boundaries set by a theory of constitutional interpretation. When
such invocations of morality influence legal conclusions, there is a
disjunction between law and morality from the view of that interpretive theory. Disjunctions between law and morality denote instances
in which a vision of positive law does not follow from an interpretive
theory’s guidelines governing morality. Either an interpreter does
not follow the theory’s requirements relating law and morality, or she
does not adhere to a vision of morality within the dictates of the theory. Legal fictions and legal myths may encourage impermissible
views of morality. An interpreter might advance a moral view outside
the range of moral views allowed by a theory if she mischaracterizes
the facts that define that range.
Of course, some theories of constitutional interpretation render
the notion of disjunction between law and morality unintelligible.
Strict positivist accounts present law as an operational system apart
45

46
47

Id. at 10–11 (arguing that judges may not read their own convictions into the Constitution “unless they find it consistent in principle with the structural design of the Constitution as a whole, and also with the dominant lines of past constitutional interpretation by
other judges”).
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 231 (1986).
Id. at 255 (“[A]nyone who accepts law as integrity must accept that the actual political
history of his community will sometimes check his other political convictions in his overall interpretive judgment.”).
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from moral values.48 Strict natural-law theory denies that an immoral
49
requirement may be law. Yet most accounts treat morality as relevant to our construction of law but not equivalent to law itself.
Originalists seek to avoid moral questions through historical fidelity,
50
but their efforts often cloak moral judgments. Fundamental-rights
theorists draw on the themes of natural-law theory, but they do not
extend those themes to challenge enumerated constitutional provi51
sions. More typically, theorists have accounted for value judgments
that cannot be resolved without reference to morality. Like Dworkin,
they have devised theories that cabin those judgments, whether by
52
53
54
neutral principles, passive virtues, republican dialogue, or something else.
Speakers in constitutional discourse frequently allege disjunction
between law and morality. Contentious cases elicit assertions that the
judges either misapplied or misconstrued moral principles. Consider
Herbert Wechsler’s critique of Brown v. Board of Education. Although
Wechsler agreed with the result, he argued that the Court’s decision
could not find support in neutral principles applicable across the law;

48
49
50

51

52
53
54

See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, at vi-viii (London,
John Murray 1832).
See generally A.P. D’ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 115 (1951) (arguing that “law is a part of ethics”).
For a clear articulation of this view, see David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 301 (2005) (arguing that moral judgments inevitably enter an
orignalist’s interpretations, and that given the originalist creed, these judgments are covert). Even Justice Scalia, the most prominent advocate of originalism, has acknowledged
this possibility. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864
(1989) (“The inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they would like it
to be will, I have no doubt, cause most errors in judicial historiography to be made in the
direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern values—so that as applied,
even as applied in the best of faith, originalism will (as the historical record shows) end
up as something of a compromise.”).
See, e.g., Lloyd Weinreb’s critique of the natural law analysis of the Constitution advanced
by David Richards in RICHARDS, supra note 43. As Weinreb argues, Richards relies on the
Constitution “to establish the validity of the moral principles he applies.” LLOYD L.
WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 116 (1987). Richards “has difficulty getting past
what he regards as incorrectly limited moral notions contained in the Constitution—
which, after all, accepted the institution of slavery,” Weinreb argues, and ultimately his
analysis “remains an analysis of the legal order according to its own premises, which are
validated only within the legal order itself.” Id. at 117.
See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
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that is, the court misapplied its interpretive guidelines.55 Of course,
many other writers have defended Brown with a similar view of morality but a different vision of the proper role of morality in legal interpretation. For Dworkin, the decision does not represent a disjunction between law and morality; rather, it reverses a status quo built on
an impermissible conception of morality given the development of
56
social views after Plessy v. Ferguson.
3. Law and Practice
Practice, like morality, has a somewhat controversial place in constitutional interpretation. Once again, the originalist will deny that
present practice can legitimately enter into what should be a purely
historical inquiry. Let us postpone the response to the originalist to
be clear about what disjunction between law and practice is not.
Scholars often identify a difference between “law in books” and “law
57
in action.” This difference speaks to the distance between imperative and conjunctive; that is, the law is not adequately enforced in
practice. Surely, this departure between law and practice represents a
contradiction in every sense of the word. It does not, however, represent a disjunction of the type with which I am concerned.
For our purposes, a disjunction between law and practice denotes
an instance when conclusions of law do not follow from practice in
accordance with the dictates of a constitutional theory. Social and
legislative practice informs legal meaning for most theories of constitutional interpretation. Lawrence Lessig’s linguistic analysis of fideli58
ty in translation conveys this point in particularly vivid terms. As
Lessig argues, reading constitutional text inevitably takes place within
a social context. Lessig criticizes the notion that we may achieve fidelity to that text merely by determining its meaning within the context of its authors. Fidelity to any text, he argues, requires translating
the meaning within the context of the authors into the context inhabited by the readers. This process requires not only an under59
standing of history, but also an understanding of the present.
55
56
57
58
59

Wechsler, supra note 52, at 31–35.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE supra note 46, at 387–88.
For a classic statement of this dichotomy, see Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 22 (1910).
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1993).
As Lessig puts the point, “[i]f context matters to meaning, and if contexts may change,
then the reader focused on fidelity needs a way to neutralize or accommodate the effect that
changing context may have on meaning. Fidelity, that is, needs a way of reading that preserves meaning despite changes in context.” Id. at 1177.
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Lessig’s argument is well known, and there is no need to rehash it
here. His point is perhaps most clear in its application to the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment. To
interpret this provision, we might look to what the Framers considered to be cruel and unusual at the time of the Founding. This, Lessig argues, would be to pronounce fidelity to the Founding context
rather than the Founding meaning. The fidelity Lessig envisions, by
contrast, would call upon modern interpreters to translate this prohibition into the modern context. Whereas the Framers may have
viewed flogging as a permissible punishment within the Clause, modern notions of what constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment do
not. By discerning how the Framers understood the provision within
their social context, we may discern an equivalent meaning within
60
ours.
In theory, an interpretive approach could render comparisons between law and practice unintelligible. We might arrive at the view
that practice has no necessary relationship with law. Lessig defines
61
this view as one-step fidelity. If this were the case, there could not
be a relevant disjunction between these unrelated elements. Or, we
might arrive at the view that law simply is practice. This view would
eliminate the possibility of a departure between elements that are
one and the same thing. Neither of these views is very plausible,
however. As Lessig argues, even self-proclaimed one-step fidelitists
like Justice Scalia accept the notion of translation when it comes to
transparently contextual terms like “cruel and unusual” punish62
ment. To equate practice with law, moreover, would be to deny the
constitutional project altogether; we would not be bound by history,
morality, or any other force that transcends the present.
Most interpretive approaches openly accept the notion that practice influences legal meaning. Lessig’s criticism centers on the failure
of some theorists to discern the importance of translation for constitutional provisions built on words less obviously normative than “cru63
el and unusual.” Translation reflects the primary project of living
constitutionalism in its various forms. The notion of living constitutionalism highlights an important quality of disjunctions between law
and practice: as practice changes, so will the dictates of conjunction
60
61
62
63

Id. at 1185–88.
Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1187.
Indeed, it is more often the normative assumptions that circumscribe the words that
change, rather than the particular content of the words themselves. Consider, for example, Lessig’s discussion of the meaning of Article V. See id. at 1220–24.
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between law and practice.64 Accordingly, a conjunction may transform into disjunction and a disjunction may transform into conjunction. To the extent that social views of morality change over time as
well, disjunctions between law and morality will exhibit similar patterns.
II. THE ENLIGHTENMENT IDEAL
As you descend from Sinai, it will be difficult to ignore the path
advised by a chorus of voices that echoes across our constitutional
landscape. This is the path of the Enlightenment ideal. The Enlightenment ideal dictates three foundational principles for constitutional theorists. First, it demands a broad and deep inquiry into
sources of social meaning. Second, it demands that theories of social
meaning rest on assertions of fact rather than fiction. Third, it demands that theories of social meaning consistently and uniformly adhere to their own tenets. From these three principles, a fairly
straightforward conclusion follows: when you return from Sinai, you
should spare no effort to eliminate the mythology and disjunctions
that you encounter.
A. The Founding and Enlightenment
Scholarship on the Enlightenment origins of the Constitution has
fallen out of vogue. Where earlier debates assessed the influence of
European Enlightenment in the Colonies, contemporary ones delve
into the more uniquely American qualities of intellectual movements
65
in the Revolutionary period. Nonetheless, a dominant constitutive
myth of American constitutionalism continues to link the Framers
66
with the Enlightenment. For modern scholars, as for Enlightenment thinkers, a definition of Enlightenment has remained elusive. I
have no illusions about providing clarity in this area. Rather, I identify a particular disposition characteristic of Enlightenment thought.
64

65

66

Of course, these shifts must be harmonized with a theory’s understanding of the relationship between law and history as well as law and morality. Shifts in the legal and non-legal
presuppositions that underlie interpretation inform how we construct both the content
and importance of history and morality relevant to interpretation.
Colin Bonwick, Enlightenment and Experience: The Virginia Constitution of 1776, in AMERICA
AND ENLIGHTENMENT CONSTITUTIONALISM 177 (Gary L. McDowell & Johnathan O’Neill
eds., 2006).
Scholars often invoke the Enlightenment to categorize the Founding. See, e.g., AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 243 (2005) (noting in passing that a
“general commitment to Enlightenment values (slavery aside) pulsated through the Constitution”).
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It is no surprise that Enlightenment remains a prominent motif in
scholarship about the Founding. As Bernard Bailyn writes, leading
Enlightenment thinkers “were quoted everywhere in the colonies, by
67
everyone who claimed a broad awareness.” The “pervasiveness of
68
such citations,” Bailyn notes, “is at times astonishing.” Writers re69
ferred to Americans as “an enlightened people.” Prominent revolutionary thinkers joined the pantheon of luminaries of the European
70
For Bailyn, however, the colonists portrayed
Enlightenment.
knowledge of Enlightenment that tended toward the superficial.
More than an Enlightenment program, colonists conveyed awe of En71
lightenment.
A better understanding of the European Enlightenment would
not necessarily have yielded a more precise Enlightenment program
in the Colonies. Enlightenment is simply a label retroactively applied
72
to a set of intellectual perspectives. We associate enlightenment
with the advance of reason at the expense of tradition and culture.
To recycle a few recurrent tropes, Enlightenment thinkers engaged
73
in a “struggle of light against darkness,” “transforming the invisible
into the visible, the ineffable into the discursive, and the unknown in74
to the known.” Some obvious questions arise. What is reason? Why
did it oppose tradition and culture? What lay in light and in darkness? On this, Enlightenment thinkers were not of a uniform view.
At a sufficiently high level of generality, however, some patterns
emerge. Consider Kant’s famous dictum, “Enlightenment is mankind’s
75
exit from its self-incurred immaturity.” What is immaturity? For Kant, it
is “the inability to make use of one’s own understanding without the
67
68
69
70
71
72

73
74
75

BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27 (1967).
Id.
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 5 (1969)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
For a survey of these contributions, see ROBERT A. FERGUSON, THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT 1750–1820 (1997).
BAILYN, supra note 67, at 28.
Accordingly, there are many debates about to whom it should be applied and how the
term should be qualified for different strands of thought, including in relation to the
Framers. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 311–13 (1992) (discussing confusion wrought by using the term “enlightenment” to describe thought emerging from the French Revolution
and the English Revolution).
FERGUSON, supra note 70, at 25.
STEPHEN ERIC BRONNER, RECLAIMING THE ENLIGHTENMENT: TOWARD A POLITICS OF
RADICAL ENGAGEMENT 19 (2004).
Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in WHAT IS
ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANSWERS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY QUESTIONS
58, 58 (James Schmidt ed., 1996).
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guidance of another.”76 We must, he writes, “have the courage to use
77
[our] own understanding.” How do we reach said understanding?
We must aspire to thought unimpeded by “[r]ules and formulas, these mechanical instruments of a rational use (or rather misuse) of
78
[our] natural gifts.” Why employ those natural gifts? For Kant,
“[o]ne age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place a succeeding one in a condition whereby it would be impossible for the latter
age to broaden its knowledge (particularly such pressing knowledge),
79
to cleanse itself of errors[.]” Kant hardly spoke for all Enlightenment thinkers, but this provides a start.
Enlightenment rhetoric elevated notions of breadth, fact, and coherence. Like Kant, Enlightenment thinkers called for a return to
first principles. In the pursuit of truth, no rock should remain un80
turned, no bridge untested, and no prior claim blindly trusted.
They were not quite willing, however, to abstain from privileging a
few principles above others. Inquiries into truth were to decry factual
error of any kind. Truth had to exhibit some consistent logic; it
could not rest on contradiction. The Enlightenment thinker was to
inquire broadly into the sources of truth but within the confines of
fact and logic. Of course, the details of this inquiry were a matter of
debate, as were the conclusions different inquiries demanded. The
Framers responded more to some Enlightenment thinkers than oth81
ers; indeed, it appears that they had little knowledge of Kant.
Ernest Gellner conveys this orthodoxy with particular clarity. For
Gellner, reason denoted “the notion of a single, systematic, orderly
method of the attainment of truth, incarnate in all and privileged in
82
This notion was at once “generic” and “transcendent.”83
none.”
Reason is generic in the sense that it requires “general considera76
77
78
79
80

81

82
83

Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 61.
Descartes is particularly emblematic on this point. As he put it, “as regards the opinions
to which I had until now given credence, I could not do better than to try to get rid of
them once and for all, in order to replace them later on, either with other ones that are
better, or even with the same ones once I had reconciled them to the norms of reason.”
RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 8
(Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publishing Co., 4th ed. 1998).
See Mark V. Tushnet, Sex, Drugs, and Rock ‘n’ Roll: Some Conservative Reflections on Liberal
Jurisprudence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534 (1982) (book review) (arguing that while the
Framers “knew what Milton and Locke had said . . . they were largely ignorant of the contemporaneous writings of Kant”).
ERNEST GELLNER, REASON AND CULTURE: THE HISTORIC ROLE OF RATIONALITY AND
RATIONALISM 178 (1992).
Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted).
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tions” and must be both “tidy and systematic: what [reason] does, fits
84
into a wider order.” Reason is transcendent in the sense that “[t]he
criteria she deploys, the truths she attained, are not tied to the organ85
ism, social or other, within which she happens to be functioning.”
In this sense, Enlightenment reason harbors an irresolvable conflict.
Just as reason rejects orthodoxy governing thought, it advances an orthodoxy of its own: “[t]he notion of the exclusive, jealous and orderly deity, which had helped engender rational unificatory thought, it86
self in the end also sinned against it.”
Given these tensions, some scholars have sought to abandon the
idea of Enlightenment reason altogether. Building on the work of
87
Margaret Jacob, James Q. Whitman distinguishes between reason
and hermeticism. Whitman writes:
“Hermeticism” is reasoning—but it is reasoning that starts from a critical
assumption: the assumption that there is a key to the universe. A person
engaging in hermetic reasoning believes that the process of reason
(whether inductive or deductive) will reveal some relatively simple principle or relatively coherent scheme that explains how the world works;
ideally something with the simplicity and evident grandeur (to take the
model most popular in [the] eighteenth century) of Newtonian gravity.
It hardly needs to be emphasized that this assumption is neither required
88
nor justified by the concept of “reason” itself.

For Whitman, hermeticism better describes many of the popular aspects of Enlightenment thought. These aspects, he argues, inherited
the Ramist tradition of logic and contributed to the allure of Enlight89
enment movements like freemasonry.
Consistent with Enlightenment rhetoric, Founding rhetoric emphasized breadth of inquiry, factual grounding, and structural coherence. Consider Hamilton’s descriptions of the Constitution in Federalist No. 9. According to Hamilton, “[i]f it had been found
impracticable, to have devised models of a more perfect structure,
the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences has received great

84
85
86
87

88
89

Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 178.
See generally MARGARET C. JACOB, LIVING THE ENLIGHTENMENT: FREEMASONRY AND
POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (1991); MARGARET C. JACOB, THE RADICAL
ENLIGHTENMENT: PANTHEISTS, FREEMASONS AND REPUBLICANS (1981).
James Q. Whitman, Reason or Hermeticism?: A Comment, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 193, 198
(1997).
Id. at 199–200.
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improvement.”90 Through the separation of powers, checks and balances, an independent judiciary, and popular representation, Hamilton posited that “the excellencies of republican government may be
91
retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.” This combination of “new discoveries” and revived notions that had “made their
principal progress towards perfection in modern times” promised a
92
system beyond improvement.
Hamilton’s claims may seem naïve or propagandistic. Nonetheless, they capture a central element of the Founding project. As Gordon Wood puts it in his classic account, the Framers “sought to understand politics, as [they] had all of life, by capturing in an integratintegrated, ordered, changeless ideal the totality and complexity of
93
the world.” In the first years of the republic, the Newtonian meta94
As
phor became common in descriptions of the Constitution.
Whitman writes, the Founding notion of constitutionalism derived
from “the idea of the ‘natural’ constitution of the human body, an
idea ultimately borrowed from the alien world of Hippocratic medi95
cine.” To build a constitution required scientific inquiry into the
truth of our political nature.
The Founding concern with breadth, fact, and coherence did not
dictate a particular approach to constitutionalism. Henry F. May’s
account of Enlightenment in America is instructive in this regard.
May identifies four Enlightenment movements: Moderate Enlightenment, Skeptical Enlightenment, Revolutionary Enlightenment, and
96
Didactic Enlightenment. As their names suggest, these movements
reached different conclusions as to how to best fashion political order
according to reason. The Moderate Enlightenment defended balance and compromise akin to the English system, whereas the Skeptical Enlightenment favored absolutism of the type propounded by the
French philosophes. The Revolutionary Enlightenment counseled
radical breaks with past culture, whereas the Didactic Enlightenment
favored incremental change and defended intellectual culture. Of
course, these divisions oversimplify matters. They convey, however,
the many Enlightenment paths open to the Framers.

90
91
92
93
94
95
96

THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Id.
Id.
WOOD, supra note 69, at 606.
See generally MICHAEL FOLEY, LAWS, MEN AND MACHINES:
MODERN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND THE APPEAL OF NEWTONIAN MECHANICS 3–4 (1990).
Whitman, supra note 88, at 199.
See HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA, at xvi (1976).
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May convincingly identifies the Framers with the Moderate Enlightenment and the Didactic Enlightenment. In a much-quoted passage of Federalist No. 14, Madison notes that although the people
“have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other
nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for
97
custom, or for names.” The basic contours of the new constitutional
order, however, followed colonial government and the English sys98
tem. The Framers devised a constitutional scheme to address con99
cerns that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm”
and that “[t]he reason of man, like man himself is timid and cau100
That scheme did not veer into the more
tious, when left alone.”
radical currents that would envelop France. This is not to say, however, that a more radical path would have been inconsistent with reason. Rather, it is to say that they reasoned to a different conclusion
101
about the dictates of reason.
That conclusion, to borrow a construct from Paul Kahn, sought to
unify scientific reason with popular will. For the Framers, Kahn argues, scientific government would be illegitimate without consent,
and popular government would be bad government without science.
Accordingly, the goal of the Founding project was “to achieve popular legitimation of an objectively true political order, to found popu102
lar choice on popular, though still genuine, wisdom.” Its success is
open to interpretation, as is the question of what we should do when
reason and will diverge. For Kahn, reason could not triumph over
will; the Framers could not impose the true path upon the public, at
least not with a clear conscience. For other theorists, reason must
triumph over will; it is reason—not will—that legitimates a constitu103
tional order. Such debate highlights once again the range of possible structures dictated by our three tenets of Enlightenment.
This is not to say that the Founding story can only be told with
reference to the Enlightenment. We often tell a different story: that
104
This story
the Constitution was born of a series of compromises.
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 88 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
This argument has been most prominently advanced in WOOD, supra note 69.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 340 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See MAY, supra note 96, at 360 (discussing the influence of the Revolutionary Enlightenment on American thought).
PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY:
SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 17 (1992).
This is, for example, the approach of the German Constitution.
For a recent articulation of this view, see John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the
Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 428–32 (2010).
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highlights the politics necessary to bring together disparate factions.
At its most extreme, it casts the Constitution as a product of self105
I do not intend to disparage this acinterested politics of power.
count. Surely, there are elements of truth in it, although it is clear
106
that Charles Beard overstated his case. This view merely represents
another strand running through our constitutional discourse; it does
not alter the echoes of Enlightenment rhetoric that reverberate from
the Founding period. As we will see, this view of the Constitution as
born of compromise is harmonious with another organizing force
within our constitutional system: the common law culture.
The key here is that the Framers spoke of their constitutional project as a product of breadth, fact, and coherence. Even if the new
structure did not mark a transcendent break with past practice or follow an Enlightenment notion of principle, its proponents paid obeisance to enlightenment. The Framers looked to the nature of government, the nature of the American people, the nature of human
ordering, and so on, seeking genuine understanding. They proposed
an order that derived from those understandings and promised a
Newtonian coherence. We might say that they failed. This should
not, however, obscure the Founding rhetoric. That rhetoric would
outlast the Founding, giving rise to dual concerns with constitutional
rediscovery and constitutional perfection.
B. Interpretation and Enlightenment
By most metrics, the act of framing a constitutional order is quite
different from the act of interpreting one. The former devises a system of government, whereas the latter construes the meaning of such
a system. From the perspective of the Enlightenment ideal, however,
these acts are of the same ilk. Recall the Hippocratic notion that
each human body has a natural constitution. For the Enlightenment
ideal, both the framer of a new constitutional order and the interpreter of an existing constitutional order are to discern the dictates
of the constitution of the relevant political body. Both the framer
and the interpreter construe the same transcendent truth. The dif-

105

106

For perhaps the most prominent example, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 324 (1941) (arguing that
movement for the Constitution was first made by “a small and active group of men immediately interested through their personal possessions in the outcome of their labors.”).
For a classic critique, see generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS
167–348 (1968).
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ference between them lies in time; the interpreter confronts a political body shaped by the framer.
Like the Framers, we speak of uncovering the dictates of our national constitution, which is to say the dictates of the composition of
our collective political body. Like the Framers, we speak of that enterprise with reference to three tenets of Enlightenment: first principles, factual accuracy, and structural coherence. Unlike the Framers,
however, we confront a political body with a tangible touchstone: the
written Constitution. That text occupies the focal point of inquiries
into the principles that animate our political order as well as inquiries
into the principles that might animate our political order with reform. We invoke the language of Enlightenment both to uncover
our constitution and to transform it.
Begin with the Marshall Court. Comprised of members of the
Founding generation, the Court invoked the spirit of Enlightenment
in order to reach results that at times sound as much of creation as
interpretation. Consider the Court’s most studied cases, Marbury v.
107
108
In each, Chief Justice MarMadison and McCulloch v. Maryland.
shall engages in a broad inquiry into the first principles animating
the substance and legitimacy of the Constitution. He turns to a close
reading of the text and an unyielding commitment to constitutional
coherence. The demands of the coherent constitutional structure
109
We
ratified by the people, Marshall claims, dictates each result.
110
may contest this claim; indeed, many scholars have. Yet, even if imperfectly or unfaithfully, the Court purported to reason to the dictates of our political constitution in accordance with the Enlightenment ideal.
With the passing of the Founding generation, courts and commentators abandoned anything resembling creation, embracing
more distant notions of interpretation. When Abraham Lincoln delivered his Lyceum Address in 1838, he lamented that the Founding
generation and its “pillars of the temple of liberty” had “crumbled

107
108
109
110

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
See KAHN, supra note 102, at 24–31 (describing Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury and
McCulloch as applied political science).
Scholars have been more critical of Marbury than McCulloch. For some prominent critiques of Marbury, see BICKEL, supra note 53, at 15–23; LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 56–77 (1958); and James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893). For a recent critique of McCulloch, see generally Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment,
Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889 (2008).
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away.”111 Without those pillars, he warned, the “temple must fall, unless we, their descendents, supply their places with other pillars, hewn
112
Lincoln’s prescription?
from the solid quarry of sober reason.”
“Reason, cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason,” which would
113
“furnish all the materials for our future support and defense.”
Modern generations needed to mold those materials into “general intelligence, sound morality, and in particular, a reverence for the constitution
114
In so doing, they would prevent the tyranny and unand laws.”
reason guarded against by the framers and in much the same fashion.
Reverence may sound of a departure from the Enlightenment
ideal, but it need not. Paul Kahn distinguishes between the notion of
applied science advanced by the Founding generation and the notion
of constitutional maintenance that emerged with Lincoln and thinkers like Joseph Story and John C. Calhoun. Whereas members of the
Founding generation reasoned to a new constitutional order, Kahn
argues, their immediate successors hoped merely to “maintain the ed115
ifice made by the founders.” Framed thusly, the effort to maintain
the Constitution echoes the Founding inquiry, even if not its particular conclusions. Like the Framers, Story and Calhoun embarked upon a searching inquiry into the dictates of our national constitution.
For them, that constitution rested in the Founding pact devised by
the Framers. They spoke of the fundamental principles of our consti116
tutional order and amendments that would perfect it. As John Norton Pomeroy wrote in 1868, “[o]ur fathers, by an almost divine pres117
cience, struck the golden mean” in devising our political system.
118
We were to reason to the “truth of history.”
111

112
113
114
115
116

117
118

Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address Before the
Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 27, 1838), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 76, 84 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2001).
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 84–85.
KAHN, supra note 102, at 35.
See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 12, 112 (Richard K. Cralle ed.,
Charleston, S.C., Walker & James 1851) (invoking the “great principle” of the “responsibility of the rulers to the ruled” and the “fundamental principle” that “the people are the
source of all power”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 338 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833) (arguing that the Constitution
“is, and accordingly has always been, treated as a fundamental law, and not as a mere contract of government, during the good pleasure of all the persons, who were originally
bound by it, or assented to it”).
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 156 (Bos., Houghton, Osgood & Co., 4th ed. 1879).
Id. at § 152.
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The substitution of Darwin for Newton shifted visions of the
meaning of the Founding, but not the rhetoric accompanying their
justification. Invocations of first principles remained; the principles
invoked, however, called on a Darwinian notion of growth rather
119
Consider two latethan an unchanging Newtonian universe.
nineteenth-century constitutionalists: Sidney George Fisher and C.G.
Tideman. For Fisher, government was “a machine for applying principles and imposing rules of conduct essential to the well-being of a
120
people.” The results it supplies may vary, but “its ‘real being,’ to use
Plato’s language, consist[s] of the idea or truth it is intended to mani121
The set of principles devised by the Founding,
fest and execute.”
Fisher argued, called for cautious growth. For Tiedeman, by contrast,
the “fundamental principles which form the constitution of a state
cannot be created by any governmental or popular edict; they are
122
necessarily found imbedded in the national character.” Tiedeman’s
account of the legitimacy of living constitutionalism lay in a combination of founding intent and popular will.
Writing after the turn of the Twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson
spoke of constitutional growth with similar echoes of Enlightenment
thought. Wilson argued that a constitution might shift in meaning
over time but it cannot shift in principle. No method but the “principle of growth,” he argued, “has legitimate place in a system which
depends for its very life upon its integrity, upon the candor and good
conscience of its processes, upon keeping faith with its standards and
123
Judges, therefore, must “prove themits immemorial promises.”
selves such men as can discriminate between the opinion of the moment and the opinion of the age, between the opinion which springs,
a legitimate essence, from the enlightened judgment of men of
thought and good conscience, and the opinion of desire, . . . of im124
pulse and impatience.” It was the task of the public, by contrast, to
sustain courts capable of such inquiry into truth.

119

120
121
122
123
124

For a discussion of the substitution of Darwin for Newton, see, for example, Bruce
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1794–1801 (2007). It bears
emphasis that arguments that purport to derive from first principles need not yield an
unchanging Newtonian result. They may just as well yield a Darwinian notion of constitutional evolution.
SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 17 (Negro Univs. Press, 1969)
(1862).
Id.
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 16
(Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1974) (1890).
WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 159 (1908).
Id. at 172.
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The Enlightenment ideal is on display, as well, in the scientific
approaches to constitutionalism that would reach their apex in Loch125
ner v. New York. Long before that decision, Christopher Columbus
Langdell advanced a vision that law could be made both perfectly
formal and perfectly coherent. As Thomas C. Grey describes Langdell’s orthodoxy, “law is a science; its materials are all in law books;
behind the mass of those materials are a few simple principles; and
discovery of those principles will allow us to ‘master the ever-tangled
126
skein of human affairs.’” This view, infused with a notion of evolution, fed the Lochner Court’s vision that the judge was to construct a
reasonable constitutional system in accordance with scientific gov127
ernance. Once again, a broad inquiry based in fact would yield the
coherent structure dictated by our national constitution. More than
that, the elevation of science revived a brand of constitutional creativity similar to that associated with the Founding generation.
The demise of Lochner did not mark the demise of science in constitutional interpretation, nor the demise of the Enlightenment ideal.
Both forces garnered criticism in the legal realist movement, which
aspired to scientific understanding of the law but eschewed the notion that legal interpretation pursued first principles, factual accura128
cy, or structural coherence. Although the Court rejected Lochner’s
brand of science in the New Deal cases, it continued to accept a role
for a different brand of science for discerning public values. As Justice Jackson put it in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the
New Deal Court inhabited a world that had replaced the laissez faire

125
126

127
128

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (1983) (quoting C.C.
Langdell, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vii–ix (Bos., Little, Brown
& Co., 2d ed. 1879)).
For a discussion of Lochner in the frame of scientific governance, see KAHN, supra note
102, at 97–117.
Of course, the legal realist label has long been contested and of uncertain descriptive value. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 735–38
(2009) (describing disputes among early legal realists about the meaning of the realist label). The two strands mentioned here can be illustrated with reference to two of the
most prominent realists. Jerome Frank famously applied the tenets of psychoanalysis to
law, arguing that we must eliminate the delusions produced by our collective search for a
father figure in the law and instead question “not hastily, angrily, rebelliously, but calmly
and dispassionately—our bequests from the past, our social heritage.” JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 245 (1930). Whereas Frank condemned the delusions produced by our pursuit of a father figure in the law, Thurman Arnold defended both the
delusions of law and the incoherence they obscured. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 44 (1935) (“It is child’s play for the realist to show that law is
not what it pretends to be . . . . Yet the legal realist falls into grave error when he believes
this to be a defect in the law.”).
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“principle of non-interference” with principles demanding “closer in129
tegration of society” and “governmental controls.” In reaching that
conclusion, the Court drew on principle: Lochner, it argued, had con130
travened the “principles” demanded by the Commerce Clause. By
returning to first principles, the Court purported to right the ship.
For constitutional theorists, the task of the post-New Deal era lay
in legitimating that reversal within a coherent constitutional framework. The Court’s decision in Brown made it difficult to tell a story of
simple repudiation—what was the scope of the judicial power? Once
again, theorists labored to discern the dictates of our constitutional
body. In his 1958 Holmes Lectures, Learned Hand returned to Marbury only to find the decision more expansive than the constitutional
text. Accordingly, he devised a theory of judicial review rooted in po131
A year later, Herbert Wechsler employed a similar
litical theory.
approach to reach a different result. Wechsler’s claim that judicial
review can only be legitimate when it is “entirely principled” echoes
132
Interpretathe voices of Enlightenment present at the Founding.
tion, for Wechsler, demanded an unwavering commitment to first
principles: we must parse each issue in each case and arrive at a re133
sult that would apply across the broader constitutional universe.
In these debates, the Enlightenment ideal served as a litmus test
for proposed theories. Like Hand and Wechsler, Alexander Bickel
advanced a theory of judicial review that promised “principled adju134
dications.” Bickel’s path to principle, however, left his theory more
of a scholarly foil than an accepted account of constitutional meaning. Scholars rejected Bickel’s claim that “[n]o good society can be
135
unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden.” They
derided the obscurantism and contradiction seemingly allowed by
136
Instead, theorists gravitated toward
Bickel’s notion of prudence.
129
130

131
132
133
134
135
136

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941) (“The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure from the principles which have prevailed
in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the decision . . . [and] should be and now is overruled.”).
HAND, supra note 110, at 27.
Wechsler, supra note 52, at 19.
Id.
BICKEL, supra note 53, at 205.
Id. at 64.
Perhaps most notably, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1964) (“One
watches with fascination as Bickel walks his tightrope, as he manipulates his nonprincipled techniques of accommodation to preserve a precarious balance.”). More generally,
see Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE. L.J. 1567, 1606–

1404

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:5

theories more transparently committed to Enlightenment. Accordingly, John Hart Ely’s process-based theory has had more staying
power than Bickel’s. Ely’s theory of judicial review claims consistency
137
with principle, historical fact, and a broad constitutional coherence.
Prominent competing theories exhibit an even more overt concern with coherence and factual accuracy in constitutional interpretation. Consider two such theories: Bruce Ackerman’s theory of dualist democracy and Frank Michelman’s theory of civic republicanism.
For Ackerman, constitutional history reveals a constitutional order
rooted in extra-textual amendment and intergenerational synthesis.
If only we look, he claims, a coherent system of principled meaning
emerges. In essence, Ackerman strikes the same pose as the Framers:
He surveys our collective history to capture the coherent constitu138
For Michelman, the essence of our
tional system it must contain.
constitutional system lies in inquiries like Ackerman’s. In the notion
of civic republicanism, Michelman endeavors to place such inquiry at
the core of the task of nine justices of the Supreme Court. There,
through dialogue, Michelman envisions a project of constitutional
139
discovery much like that undertaken by the Framers. In these two
theories, and others, the rhetoric of Enlightenment lives on.
C. Mythology, Disjunction, and Enlightenment
As the preceding Parts should make clear, a dominant constitutive
myth of our constitutional order decries mythology and disjunction.
The Enlightenment ideal refuses to distinguish between constitutive
mythology and objective falsehood, and it refuses to allow objective
falsehood to influence constructions of constitutional meaning. That

137

138

139

08 (1985) (describing the rise of a “rationalist spirit” that has rendered Bickel’s notion of
prudence “an embarrassed virtue in a discipline that has always been hospitable to it”).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101–04 (1980)
(asserting that conceiving of judicial review as a mechanism to police political representation is consistent with past constitutional practice and constitutional coherence in a
manner that prevailing interpretive modes are not).
Notably, the coherent constitutional meaning Ackerman discerns places contemporary
Americans in the same position as the Framers. For Ackerman, “[i]t is only by talking together about the deepest values of dualist democracy that we can reflect on the best ways
to continue the ongoing American engagement with higher lawmaking.” 1 ACKERMAN,
supra note 31, at 57.
Michelman, supra note 54; see also Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493,
1524–32 (1988) (arguing that a civic republican view of constitutionalism legitimates judicial review because it helps “make credible for contemporary Americans the idea of social and procedural conditions under which communicative revision of a citizen’s normative understandings escapes condemnation as oppression” and because it enables the
“plurality on which [our] capacity for transformative self-renewal depends”).

May 2013]

CONSTITUTIONAL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM

1405

is, there is no such thing as a desirable falsehood or a desirable inconsistency. When we develop a theory of constitutional interpretation, these are the ground rules. Like so many constitutive myths,
however, the Enlightenment ideal does not marshal a vigorous argument for its own justification. Defenders invoke concerns about
popular sovereignty and political morality. Yet they do not offer
much of a response to scholars who have advanced visions of reason
that call for departures from constitutional truth.
Take criticism of legal fictions. First, scholars attack the legal fiction’s distortion of reality as a threat to appropriate constructions of
the law. The law may accept the distortion, but this does not elimi140
nate the false premise. Second, scholars contend that fictions produce obscurantism and confusion about the law. Falsehoods draw
our attention away from factors animating legal decisions and they
141
introduce complication into the legal fabric. Third, scholars charge
legal fictions with bringing the law into disrepute for its endorsement
of patent falsehoods. A single visible falsehood, by this view, may
142
harm the institution of legal ordering. These three criticisms do little more than parrot Enlightenment conclusions. Fictions distort the
law because our view of the law disallows them. Fictions confuse because we do not theorize about them. Fictions sully the law’s reputation because we construct a reputation that eschews fictions.
Criticism of legal myth evokes a similarly conclusory flavor.
Scholars attack legal myth on two primary grounds. First, legal myth
inhibits our ability to reason to first principles. Suppose that no person recognizes the falsehood of a particular premise. The legal myth
preserves that false premise and accordingly produces mistaken con143
Second, legal myth inhibits democratic processes. Supclusions.
pose that a few people recognize the falsehood of a particular prem140

141

142

143

This critique is so omnipresent it hardly needs detailing. For a colorful statement, see
Jeremy Bentham, Scotch Reform, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 13 (John Bowring
ed., 1962) (defining legal fiction as a “willful falsehood, uttered by a judge, for the purpose of giving to injustice the colour of justice”).
See, e.g., MAINE, supra note 18, at 26 (arguing that “it is unworthy of us to effect an admittedly beneficial object by so rude a device as the legal fiction” because the legal fiction
“makes the law either more difficult to understand or harder to arrange in harmonious
order”).
Although Roscoe Pound would later become more accepting of the legal fiction, his initial work criticized it largely for this reason. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation,
7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 384 (1907) (“[I]n a modern state, spurious interpretation of statutes, and especially constitutions, tends to bring law into disrepute.”).
This is one of the most common strands within the law review genre; the author exposes a
supposed myth and then charts the course to rectify the consequences of that myth. See,
e.g., Ely, supra note 27 (conducting such an analysis of the Erie doctrine).
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ise, but most do not. Those left in the dark would be subject to the
whims of those aware of the light. In a purely functional sense, this
state of affairs pushes popular dialogue away from prevailing views of
144
democracy. In a more philosophical sense, it threatens to impinge
145
on concerns with equality, transparency, dignity, and the like. These assaults on legal myth, however, seldom occupy the legal scholar.
For her, their conclusions are simply assumed.
Scholars have not advanced much additional justification for their
condemnation of disjunction. In essence, they argue that falsehood
obscures genuine legal meaning. As Karl Llewellyn argued, “[a] theory which suffers from any such misrepresentation of the facts confuses and distorts issues. It cannot help but lead, repeatedly, to pur146
Such action, Llewellyn argues, “even when it is
blind action.”
informed by considerable intuition, registers an unfortunate number
147
of misses on occasions when bull’s-eyes are needed.” Of course, if a
constitutional theory provided a place for legal fiction and legal
myth, they could be accommodated without rendering disjunction. A
theory that accepted all legal fictions and legal myths would be no
theory at all, but a theory that allowed some would merely be a theory
148
contrary to the Enlightenment ideal. Attacks on disjunction rarely
endeavor to criticize such theories—or, indeed, to acknowledge their
possibility.
This omission flies in the face of a small but substantial group of
scholars that has advanced affirmative arguments for mythology and
disjunction. These arguments have taken two forms. One group of
scholars has questioned the internal consistency of the Enlightenment ideal. For these scholars, the Enlightenment ideal represents
another legal fiction if not a legal myth. Accordingly, they have suggested that we eschew the ideal and recognize our acceptance of mythology and disjunction. Another group has defended mythology
and disjunction despite their contravention of the Enlightenment

144

145
146
147
148

This line of criticism is one motivating force behind Bruce Ackerman’s effort to expose
the process of extratextual amendment. Only with prevailing myths exposed, the argument goes, can our constitutional system function in accordance with popular will. See 1
ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 3–6 (describing the “reconstructive enterprise” interpretation of the Constitution).
For example, John Rawls argues that publicity must be a condition for reaching a concept
of right. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130 & n.5 (1971).
K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1934) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 3.
That is, a theory that accepted all legal fictions and legal myths would accept any falsehood, and thus would fail to meaningfully differentiate any two systems of meaning.

May 2013]

CONSTITUTIONAL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM

1407

ideal. These scholars reject the Enlightenment ideal as a suboptimal
constitutional principle, not because it fails to satisfy its own principles. They contend that some deftly introduced mythology and disjunction may assist our constitutional order.
Consider, first, scholarly efforts to expose the internal contradictions of the Enlightenment ideal. The Enlightenment ideal, according to scholars of this view, is no more foundational than any other
system of social meaning. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s
classic treatment of the Enlightenment puts the point nicely. “In the
enlightened world,” they write, “mythology has entered into the profane. In its blank purity, the reality which has been cleansed of demons and their conceptual descendents assumes the numinous char149
The
acter which the ancient world attributed to demons.”
particular brand of reason advanced by Enlightenment thought, they
argue, inevitably collapses upon itself. That is, the Enlightenment
ideal is itself a product of mythology and devolves into the transparent falsehood Adorno and Horkheimer perceived in European fas150
cism.
Legal scholars have extended this notion to the Enlightenment’s
influence on our visions of the Constitution. Echoing calls among
the legal realists, Max Lerner argued that “[e]very tribe needs its to151
For Lerner, this
tem and its fetish, and the Constitution is ours.”
constitutional reverence produced a vision of judges not as “ordinary
men, subject to ordinary passions, but ‘discoverers’ of final truth,
152
priests in the service of a godhead.” A similar view prompted Sanford Levinson, years hence, to warn that “[t]he ‘death of constitutionalism’ may be the central event of our time just as the ‘death of
153
God’ was that of the past century (and for much the same reason).”
The Enlightenment ideal, in this sense, sows the seeds of its own destruction.
A few scholars have taken up Levinson’s warning and embraced
the possibility of the death of constitutionalism. Steven D. Smith has
argued that given the “labyrinthine emptiness” that characterizes
149
150

151
152
153

THEODOR W. ADORNO & MAX HORKHEIMER, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 28 (John
Cumming trans., 1997).
See, e.g., id. at 194 (“True madness lies primarily in immutability, in the inability of the
thought to participate in the negativity in which thought—in contradistinction to fixed
judgment—comes into its own. The paranoiac insistence on rationality, the poor infinity
of an unchanging judgment, reveals a lack of sequacious thought.”).
Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294 (1937).
Id. at 1312.
Sanford Levinson, “The Constitution” in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123,
151.
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constitutional interpretation,154 it may be true that “reason teaches
155
Pierre
the futility of trying to live in accordance with reason.”
Schlag has been less equivocal. He argues that reason inevitably devolves into a dogmatic force that serves the law’s will rather than any
foundational set of principles. Reason becomes the excuse to construct “endless legal mazes” rather than a force that deepens under156
“When reason runs out, but continues to rule,” Schlag
standing.
argues, “we get precisely what we see all around us—the excessive
157
construction of a pervasively shallow form of life.” For these scholars, the way out lies in replacing dogma with genuine engagement.
These arguments, however, have garnered little sustained response from adherents of the Enlightenment ideal. They have occupied the fringes of the Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies
Movements, and they have been rejected more as inconvenient than
incorrect. In this sense, Owen Fiss spoke for an entire legal orthodoxy when he rejected the view that we cannot reason to objective
constitutional meaning: “It must be combated and can be, though
158
perhaps only by affirming the truth which is being denied . . . .”
There is not much debate about the merits of reason, much less Enlightenment reason. The conclusion is assumed, and contrarians
159
merely contrarians.
Consider, next, scholarly efforts to defend the introduction of mythology and disjunction in legal interpretation. Scholars have defended legal fictions as tools of both expediency and coherence.
Blackstone argued that so long as the law follows the maxim that “no
fiction should extend to work an injury,” fictions would be “highly
beneficial and useful” as a means to “prevent a mischief, or remedy
160
an inconvenience, that might result from the general rule of law.”
John Chipman Gray expressed doubts about the potential legal distortions that might arise from remedies of this sort, but he defended
161
Perhaps most
legal fictions that organize the structure of the law.

154
155
156
157
158
159

160
161

STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION & THE PRIDE OF REASON 123 (1998).
Id. at 150.
PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 144 (1998).
Id. at 145.
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 763 (1982).
For a prescient description of the declining influence of challenges like the one to which
Fiss responded, see Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J.
1515, 1537–44 (1991).
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at *43.
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 36 (Gaunt, Inc. 1999)
(1909) (arguing that fictions “should never be used, as the historic fictions were used to
change the Law, but only for the purpose of classifying established rules”).
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prominently, Lon Fuller combined these strands, arguing that legal
fictions allow us “to plaster together the weak spots in our intellectual
162
There have not been comparably systematic defenses
structure.”
for legal fiction in the constitutional realm, but occasional defenses
163
of individual fictions evoke the same two concerns. Active defenses
of constitutional fictions, however, are rare.
Defenses of legal myths take two similar tacks. First, scholars argue that legal myths may help improve substantive outcomes in a utilitarian sense. Meir Dan-Cohen, for example, has defended an
“acoustic separation” between rules applied by judges and rules per164
Such a separation, Dan-Cohen argues, may
ceived by the public.
165
help improve compliance with criminal law. Second, scholars argue
that legal myths allow us to diffuse the destructive consequences of
choices between irreconcilable values. This view is most associated
166
with Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbit’s analysis of tragic choices,
167
Scholars of this
though it has a longer history in American law.
bent have argued that although we should presume in favor of candor, candor may undermine confidence in the law. Although neither
of these arguments has singled out the constitutional realm, they apply there with as much force as in the common law or statutory contexts.
Beneath these defenses of legal fiction and legal myth lie defenses
of disjunction. Of course, an interpretive theory might demand certain legal fictions and legal myths. In such case, the presence of
those fictions and myths would signal conjunction rather than disjunction. The defenses just enumerated, however, seek to justify departures from theory rather than to justify falsehood within theory.
They excuse departures from a broader theory of interpretation. The
162
163

164
165

166
167

FULLER, supra note 17, at 52.
For example, David Currie described the rule in Ex Parte Young as based on an “outlandish conceptual justification” and yet argued that “[b]ehind the outlandish conceptual justification concocted to support this holding lay the not implausible conviction that federal constitutional rights could not be adequately protected without the intervention of
federal equity; therefore the philosophy of immunity had to yield.” David P. Currie, The
Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1964).
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984).
Id. at 668 (arguing that “the clarity and specificity of decision rules, and hence their effectiveness as guidelines, may be enhanced by the use of a technical, esoteric terminology
that is incomprehensible to the public at large”).
See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 128, at 247–48 (arguing that the “greatness of law” lies in its
creation of an “appearance of unity while tolerating and enforcing ideals which run in all
sorts of opposing directions,” which “provides a way of talking about all the unsolved and
unsolvable problems of society”).
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legal fiction circumvents the dictates of an interpretive theory for the
sake of some combination of expedience and coherence. The legal
myth obscures departures from an interpretive theory for similar reasons. A theory cannot develop an account of its legitimate circumvention; this would merely alter the content of the range of actions
legitimated by the theory. Prevailing defenses of legal fiction and legal myth, then, defend more than just falsehood; they defend disjunction.
Once again, proponents of the Enlightenment ideal have not responded with much more than condemnation. Defenses of legal fiction have not been met with much more than the claim that false168
hood anywhere is a threat to constitutionalism everywhere. In these
assertions, rhetoric runs thick; the refrain echoes Bentham’s quip
169
Defenses of legal
that fiction constitutes “a syphilis” in the law.
myth have been met with much the same. David L. Shapiro sums up
the prevailing view that no scholar has rebutted the presumption for
170
Although Dan-Cohen and
judicial candor in any significant way.
Calabresi’s arguments against candor garnered much scholarly interest, they have not garnered many followers. Given the condemnation
of both legal fiction and legal myth, disjunction has not received any
sustained attention.
III. THE COMMON LAW CULTURE
Our constitutional order may have been born in a time of Enlightenment, but it emerged within a common law culture. The
Framers and their successors did not eschew that culture; rather, they
enshrined it in our constitutional processes and our constitutional
discourse. Whereas the Enlightenment tradition invokes a notion of
reason as the key to an ordered universe, the common law culture invokes the stabilizing power of tradition. The common law culture
calls upon the judge to reason, but not in an Enlightenment sense.
Permissible judicial inquiry occupies boundaries shaped by past experience. As this Part demonstrates, the judicial inquiry demanded by
168

169
170

For a more searching recent analysis, see generally Smith, supra note 26 (analyzing “new
legal fictions” and arguing that their benefits are outweighed by the presumption in favor
of judicial candor.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 92.
See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987). Shapiro
only finds the case against candor compelling when (1) a judge faces a conflict between a
legal and moral right, (2) the judge decides he has a moral duty to support the moral
right, and (3) resignation will not fulfill the judge’s moral duty. Id. at 749–50.
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the common law culture self-consciously allows for mythology and disjunction in constitutionalism.
This Part explores five elements of our constitutional system that
arose out of the common law: justiciability doctrine, stare decisis, the
rule against retroactivity, the distinction between holding and dicta,
and the practice of writing separately. The first three elements preserve false constructions of constitutional meaning. Justiciability prevents courts from assessing mythology and disjunction that arises beyond a particular type of controversy. Stare decisis does not allow
courts to correct mythology and disjunction even when it is properly
before them. Retroactivity doctrine forbids courts from redressing
past decisions built on foundations of mythology and disjunction.
The last two elements—dicta and writing separately—expose these
realities for all to see.
A. Justiciability
Justiciability doctrine arising under the language about “cases” or
“controversies” in Article III has long been condemned as incoherent
171
and unprincipled. Much of it has been cast as the product of judi172
cial invention. This is quite understandable. It does not take much
effort to notice the wealth of meaning courts have imparted onto Ar173
ticle III’s Delphic notion of the “judicial Power.” Nor does the notion captured by justiciability lend itself to a clearly defined set of
rules or standards. Efforts to justify this body of doctrine, nonethe174
less, often turn to the understanding of the Framers. These efforts
invariably invoke the prevailing vision of the judiciary at common law.
The notion of justiciability, though not explicit in common law
courts, grasps at the private-law judicial function embodied in those
175
courts.
171
172

173
174

175

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For a recent articulation of this line of criticism, see Jonathan
R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (2007).
See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004 (2002) (“[N]o one seriously believes that the Framers chose [the words of Article III, Section 2] with anything like the
Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework in mind or that the Court’s justiciability rulings are
anything other than a judicially invented gloss on the Constitution.”).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (arguing that “history does not defeat standing doctrine;
the notion of standing is not an innovation, and its constitutionalization does not contradict a settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s meaning” (emphasis omitted)).
For a statement to this effect, see, for example, Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case or controversy requirement has “virtually no
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This is not to say that modern justiciability doctrine enshrines the
particularities of the judicial role at common law. Modern views of
justiciability echo elements of the English system in some respects but
not in others. The constitutional prohibition on advisory opinions,
for example, has been settled law since the first years of the Republic,
176
but no such prohibition existed at common law. In refusing to issue an advisory opinion at the request of George Washington, the
177
Modern
Court invoked the Constitution’s separation of powers.
supporters of this conclusion have bolstered it with structural argu178
ments. To take another example, scholars largely agree that modern standing doctrine creates limitations that were not present at
179
common law.
Justiciability doctrines with common law roots, however, promote
common law notions of litigation and adjudication. Consider, for example, the requirement of adverse parties. Although the Court has
180
reached the merits of some collusive cases, it has read Article III’s
181
In so
“case” or “controversy” requirement to preclude such cases.
doing, the Court has cast the judicial power in the common law
mold: it is the power to resolve disputes in an adversarial process.
Common law courts may have entertained advisory opinions for the
Crown, but they did not entertain them for private parties. In its relation to private parties, the judicial role did not extend to abstract interpretive inquiries; rather, it extended to the resolution of genuine
182
disputes.

176
177
178

179

180
181
182

meaning” except by reference “to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers of common law courts”).
See STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 57–76
(1997).
Id. at 179–80.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 647
(1996) (arguing that the Framers designed the Opinion Clause “to clarify the role of a
new and distinctly American idea of a President, who would be measurably less than an
English-style King, but measurably more than an English-style Prime Minister”).
See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 174, at 690 (recognizing that this is a “widely accepted academic critique[]”). For a prominent exposition of this critique, see Raoul
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816,
818 (1969) (arguing that standing is “a judicial construct pure and simple which . . . is of
relatively recent origin”).
See e.g., Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 33–34 (1804) (reaching “a feigned issue”).
See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943).
This story of the judicial role, of course, does not adequately account for the rise of public law. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (describing the characteristic attributes of public law litigation’s
party relationships and judicial role as compared with the American legal system’s “traditional model” of litigation).
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The judicial role might look quite different. We might allow
courts to engage in legal interpretation absent a genuine dispute.
For the common law lawyer, the particular facts of the dispute before
the court make the inquiry into law possible. It is not merely that
facts allow the judge to engage the intricacies of the law; the zealous
advocacy of adverse parties served to ensure the accuracy of that en183
Civil-law systems, of course, provide a more limited
gagement.
place for zealous advocacy in a process dominated by judicial inquiry.
The judicial task turns more on inquiring into facts than discerning
184
Some constitutional courts, moreover, allaw provided by statute.
low for inquiries into constitutional questions before they arise in an
185
individualized dispute.
Modern defenses of justiciability doctrine invoke two broad arguments about the judicial role. First, justiciability requirements ensure
that adjudication addresses concrete issues brought by zealous advocates. Second, justiciability requirements ensure that the courts do
not overstep their bounds vis-à-vis the political branches. The former
argument has roots in the common law notion of private rights. It
contends that litigants should have a stake in a genuine dispute capa186
ble of judicial redress. The latter argument draws on both constitutional structure and the common law notion that courts interpret law
rather than make it. This argument claims that courts should ensure
that the judicial process is representative, passive, and divorced from
politics. In essence, these defenses set forth a vision of both the sub187
ject matter and the scope of adjudication.
This common law vision of adjudication accepts a role for mythology and disjunction. Return to the adverse-party requirement. The
183

184

185
186

187

For a discussion of the influence of the common law’s adversarial process on the American legal system, see ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 3–58 (2001) (“Many, perhaps most, American lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and
politicians (many of whom are lawyers) see adversarial litigation as a vital tool for righting
wrongs, curtailing governmental and corporate arbitrariness, and achieving a just society.”).
See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 37 (1969) (describing the civil-law
judge as “a kind of expert clerk” who is “presented with a fact situation to which a ready
legislative response will be readily found in all except the extraordinary case”).
See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 914 (2006) (describing both foreign and state courts that engage in this practice).
In Baker v. Carr, for example, the Court explained that standing doctrine ensures that a
party seeking relief has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
For an overview and critique of these theories, see Siegel, supra note 171, at 90–120.
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notion that adverse parties preserve a bounded judicial role consistent with the separation of powers rings hollow; subject to standing
requirements, private parties may contrive adverse cases to garner ju188
The notion that adverse parties enhance the truthdicial review.
189
seeking function of the adjudicative process is more plausible.
Such benefits, however, come at the expense of rendering the lawyer
an agent of advocacy rather than accuracy. Adjudication becomes an
obscurantist battle in which the parties, constrained by loose ethical
requirements, often pursue misunderstanding of law and fact. Indeed, the victorious lawyer may celebrate a decision reliant on my190
thology and disjunction.
Of course, the task of the judge is to thwart such efforts. We
might accept the obscurantist tendencies of adversarial litigation if it
nonetheless presents the best path to interpretive truth. Parties
would advance mythology and disjunction, but the successful judge
would root it out. Madison might argue that the adversity requirement serves the same purpose as the separation of powers: to chan191
nel inevitable self-interest into collective truth. A few duped judges,
we might say, are well worth the broader benefits of the adversarial
system. This story may fail to grapple adequately with the array of obscurantist tools available to the lawyer, but it is nonetheless plausi192
Justiciability doctrines like standing, ripeness, and mootness,
ble.
by contrast, take a more unequivocally permissive view of mythology
and disjunction.
188

189

190

191

192

See id. at 94 (“[C]ases do not just come along. Individuals and interest groups create cases for the specific purpose of getting courts to resolve legal issues and to compel the government to obey the laws.”).
For a defense of the adversarial system along these lines, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 384 (1978) (“[T]he role of the lawyer as a
partisan advocate appears not as a regrettable necessity, but as an indispensable part of a
larger ordering of affairs. The institution of advocacy is not a concession to the frailties
of human nature, but an expression of human insight in the design of a social framework
within which man’s capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization.”). See
generally STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE
(1984).
See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1039
(1975) (“[T]he gladiator using the weapons in the courtroom is not primarily crusading
after truth, but seeking to win”).
That is, we might think of Madison’s call that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract
ambition” as a generalization of this mode of common law adjudication. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51, at 347 (James Madison) (Heritage Press 1945).
As Frankel notes, for example, the rules of professional responsibility only proscribe positive frauds; they do not compel disclosures of material facts or forbid material omissions.
Frankel, supra note 190, at 1057–58 (arguing that the rules of professional responsibility
should compel a lawyer to disclose material facts, and should forbid a lawyer from making
material omissions unless he or she is prevented by privilege).
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Let us focus on standing. Since the formal emergence of standing
doctrine after the New Deal, scholars have disputed its origins at
common law. Invoking mandamus practice and qui tam statutes that
preceded the Founding, a vocal group of scholars have sought to cast
193
These scholars
doubt on the constitutional basis for the doctrine.
have cast the doctrine as a fiction invented by Justice Frankfurter and
194
Justice Brandeis. Another set of scholars has set out to defend the
constitutional basis for standing doctrine by identifying the concept
of standing, if not the term itself, in the common law’s distinction between public and private rights. These scholars argue that private actions to protect public rights were rare at common law, if present at
195
Nonetheless, the concept of standing evokes the private-law
all.
orientation present at common law.
Defenses of the concept of standing appeal to each of the arguments advanced in defense of justiciability doctrine more broadly.
Although the contours of the doctrine are much disputed and maligned, scholars often contend that standing doctrine ensures zealous
196
These arguments are
advocacy and constrains judicial overstep.
seldom contested in the realm of private harms like tort. To confer
standing on parties not privy to the harm would impose additional
197
costs on harmed parties who choose not to seek redress in court. In
the realm of public rights, however, the arguments are more controversial. Parties who do not meet standing requirements may engage
198
Moreover,
in less zealous advocacy than would parties who do.
standing requirements hardly prevent courts from ruling on issues of
great social importance.
Standing doctrine promotes mythology and disjunction in at least
two ways. First, standing doctrine’s vague requirements of injury in
193
194
195

196

197
198

See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 174, at 690–91 (identifying this line of criticism).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992).
See, e.g., Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 174, at 692 (grounding modern standing doctrines in the “distinction between . . . public and private rights” recognized by eighteenthand-nineteenth-century courts).
See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 624 (2004) (“The
standing doctrine also promotes other judicial values, including zealous advocacy and
impartial results. Injured parties are likely to pursue their claims vigorously and the adversary process enables courts to uncover all the relevant facts and issues necessary to
reach the best and most fair outcomes.”).
That is, parties who did not wish to litigate their claims could be called upon to participate in aspects of the litigation seeking to vindicate those claims.
See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CALIF.
L. REV. 1309, 1409 (1995) (“While the Court has stated, for example, that standing is designed to promote zealous advocacy, it has denied standing to the unquestionably zealous
Sierra Club.”).
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fact, causation, and redressability allow judicial obscurantism and evasion. That is, courts may cloak the real grounds for their decisions in
199
considerations about standing. In so doing, courts introduce falsehood into the stream of the law. Second, standing doctrine prevents
courts from reaching the merits of disputes, particularly those involving diffuse public rights. In controversies that implicate constitutional questions, this allows mythology and disjunction to persist apart
from judicial inquiry. The result is not only non-enforcement; it is
200
In tandem, these two forces prompt courts to
non-interpretation.
both contribute misunderstanding to the law and preserve that misunderstanding.
Many scholars have expressed concern about standing doctrine’s
201
relationship with both obscurantism and non-enforcement. Fewer
have expressed concerns about its relationship with substantive constitutional interpretation. The cardinal interpretive sin in our legal
order is to reach constitutional issues unnecessary for the disposition
of the case at bar. It is to such actions that the oft-repeated charge of
202
“judicial activism” perhaps best applies. The canon of constitutional avoidance formalizes this view: we should be wary about deciding
constitutional issues lest we get them wrong. Presumptions against
interpretation call upon courts to preserve prevailing views of constitutional truth without interrogating them. There may be good reasons for such presumptions; in the short term, they produce con203
In the long term, however, they allow
sistency and stability.
falsehood and infidelity in constitutional interpretation.
Concerns about reaching constitutional questions unnecessary to
the case at hand occupy the shadow of the common law doctrine of
stare decisis. To misconstrue the Constitution would not only do in199

200
201

202

203

As Abram Chayes famously put this charge, the Court engages in a “ritual recitation” of
the requirements for standing and then “chooses up sides and decides the case.” Abram
Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court,
96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (1982).
This is the same result as another feature of common law adjudication: settlement. See
Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–87 (1984).
See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1371, 1373 n.14 (1988) (“Although it is probably impossible to document, I suspect
that most academics and practicing lawyers at least share the suspicion that standing law
is nothing more than a manipulation by the Court to decide cases while not appearing to
decide their merits.”).
For a discussion of how best to apply the term “judicial activism,” see Craig Green, An
Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1199 (2009) (arguing that this
“label is useful only where a judge has violated cultural standards of judicial role”).
For a defense of the constitutional avoidance canon, see, for example, BICKEL, supra note
53, at 181–83; Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000).
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justice in the present case; it would wreak havoc on future cases. I
will turn to stare decisis momentarily. Before I do, however, it is
worth noting that both mootness doctrine and ripeness doctrine present the same possibility of mythology and disjunction as standing
doctrine. Each doctrine provides an avenue for judicial obscurantism
and prevents interrogation of prevailing constitutional interpretations. Justiciability doctrine, then, advances mythology and disjunction in two ways. First, it promotes obfuscation by parties and courts.
Second, it preserves the interpretive status quo regardless of its relationship with constitutional truth.
B. Stare Decisis
Like so many central phrases of our constitutional discourse,
“stare decisis” does not appear in the text of the Constitution. Its textual mooring, moreover, is arguably more tenuous than that of justi204
ciability doctrine. While scholars have defended the concept of justiciability with respect to the separation of powers, stare decisis
represents a doctrine more purely contained in judicial process. So
long as the political branches may rely on a consistent judicial view of
precedent, it is difficult to argue that the structure of the constitutional text mandates one view of stare decisis or another. The textual
basis for stare decisis, if there is one at all, must be found in the
Founding vision of the “judicial Power” provided by Article III. That
is not to say that this basis is a stretch; stare decisis occupied the core
205
of the common law tradition inherited by the Framers.
As it has evolved, the American notion of stare decisis has taken
on a familiar set of conceptual divisions. Courts distinguish between
three levels of stare decisis: common law stare decisis, statutory stare
decisis, and constitutional stare decisis. At common law, precedent
garners heavy deference, whereas decisions on statutory and constitu206
tional grounds garner successively less. Repetition of this hierarchy
204
205

206

See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723, 754–55 (1988) (discussing the uncertain constitutional source of stare decisis).
The intent of the Framers on this point, perhaps unsurprisingly, is a rich area for scholarly debate. Compare Michael Stokes Paulson, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1550 (2000) (arguing
that the Constitution does not require that the Court accord decision-altering weight to
prior judicial precedent), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An
Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 579–80 (2001) (arguing that the
Framers understood “the judicial Power” to “include a power to create precedents of
some degree of binding force” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For a clear statement of the “three-tiered hierarchy” of stare decisis the Court follows, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988).

1418

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:5

evades the more difficult conceptual question: how should we think
of the form of deference afforded by stare decisis? Courts often invoke stare decisis to bolster independent conclusions on the merits.
It is difficult to cast such pronouncements as instances of deference.
Courts that make such decisions would have ruled the same way even
in the absence of the prior decisions. They are in no sense bound by
207
precedent; rather, they invoke it in solidarity.
The deference captured by the notion of stare decisis requires
something more. As Max Radin describes it, “the rule of stare decisis is
evidently and demonstrably being maintained only when the court
declares that the conclusion to which the rule constrains it is one
208
which it would not have reached except for the rule.” As examples,
Radin refers to conclusions “of which the court does not morally approve, which cannot be rested on conscience, equity or the public
209
welfare.” In the language of mythology and disjunction, the court
may feel confined to perpetuate a disjunction rooted in mistaken visions of history, morality, or practice. Radin’s formulation leaves out
a broader class of cases that rely on stare decisis even if they do not
say so expressly: cases in which courts refuse to reopen questions that
have already been decided. Such questions occupy much of the con210
stitutional landscape as settled law.
It goes without saying that we could have a legal regime that eschewed such constraints. Stare decisis does not exist at civil law. The
comparison need not suggest that eschewing stare decisis would nec211
essarily remake our judiciary in the image of the civil-law judge. Indeed, a regime without stare decisis could expand the interpretive
role of the judge. Unconfined by prior decisions, she could expound
the true character of the law. Nor would abandoning stare decisis
necessarily lead the judiciary to abandon history. Judges could still
invoke prior decisions to legitimate their present constructions of the
207

208
209
210

211

For a recent example, see McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 3025 (2010). In his opinion
for the majority, Justice Alito grounded the Court’s extension of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), in its adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis even though the
composition of the majority in McDonald was the same as the composition of the majority
in Heller two years before and the reasoning similar. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 3049–50.
Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Präjudizienrecht in Amerika, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 201 (1933).
Id.
See Monaghan, supra note 204, at 744–46 (arguing that stare decisis has an agendalimiting function, whereby “[m]any constitutional issues are so far settled that they are
simply off the agenda”).
For a discussion of the role of stare decisis in civil-law regimes, see MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E.
LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY
AND LEGITIMACY 54–55 (2004).
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law. In constitutional interpretation, moreover, the shifts in public
understanding reflected in past decisions might assume interpretive
significance, even if not binding significance. Past decisions would
not convey a rule or result to be followed, but rather a historical indi212
cia of perceived constitutional meaning.
In some sense, we subscribe to stare decisis because we have always
subscribed to stare decisis. Yet the doctrine draws fervent, if somewhat disjointed, theoretical defenses. These defenses rely on three
213
First, scholars and courts advance a range of
primary rationales.
utilitarian arguments that stare decisis ensures the coherence, legitimacy, and stability of the law. It conserves judicial resources, protects
reliance interests, aligns judicial inquiry with judicial competence,
214
and the like. Second, scholars and courts advance a view rooted in
fundamental fairness. By this view, equality requires that like cases
are decided alike, not just in a given moment but also across time.
To decide like cases alike, by whichever metric of likeness, does not
merely advance predictability, it ensures that the legal system safe215
guards the right to equal treatment.
The third defense of stare decisis relies on a more primal notion
of the importance of history. Anthony Kronman has advanced this
view in distinguishing philosophy and law. “We must respect the
past,” he argues, “because the world of culture that we inherit from it
makes us who we are. The past is not something that we, as already
constituted human beings, choose for one reason or another to respect; rather, it is such respect that establishes our humanity in the
216
Kronman’s argument, however, seldom accompanies
first place.”
217
the other two in the literature. Kronman has a ready explanation:
“the immense prestige that reason now enjoys in every department of

212
213
214

215

216
217

Id. at 55–56.
I borrow this division from Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J.
1029, 1036–43 (1990).
See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (1989) (describing
precedent as enhancing the reliance value and the value of general rules); Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595–97 (1987) (arguing that precedential constraint enhances fairness by ensuring consistency and predictability).
See Alexander, supra note 214, at 9–13 (arguing that reliance on precedent promotes
equality); Schauer, supra note 214, at 596 (“Equality and precedent are thus, respectively,
the spatial and temporal branches of the same normative principle of consistency.”).
Kronman, supra note 213, at 1066.
The tension between the more philosophical arguments for stare decisis and Kronman’s
Burkean claim, however, has been used to describe tensions in our constitutional order
present since the Founding. See James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason? 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (1991).
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political life.”218 We respect past generations in hope that we might
garner respect from future ones, but to merely worship the past contravenes our notions of reasoned political order.
Accordingly, we paint a partial picture of stare decisis. Consider
the Court’s discussion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. For the Court, “the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that
219
a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.” Although
this might evoke Kronman’s notion that historical fidelity confers
contemporary meaning, the Court invoked “prudential and pragmat220
Three of
ic considerations,” grounded in utility and deontology.
the four Casey factors turn on utilitarian concerns about social order.
The Court will abandon precedent if it is not workable, consistent, or
legitimate. The fourth factor, reliance, draws on both utilitarian con221
cerns and the deontological specter of inequity. Stare decisis, then,
is required by reason; “no judicial system could do society’s work,”
says the Court, “if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised
222
it.”
Reason plays a somewhat counterintuitive role in the life of stare
decisis. Kronman’s view of stare decisis contravenes the view that we
should structure society on the basis of reason alone rather than veneration for antiquity. Yet it helps to explain our veneration for the
Constitution, a historical artifact central to our cultural understanding. The utilitarian and deontological defenses of stare decisis advance reason in their concern with stability and equality. Yet stare
decisis undermines the project of vindicating a transcendent constitutional meaning. In the name of stability and equality, it allows departures from constitutional truth. As the Court affirmed in Casey, some
departures may be too broad to allow. Other departures, however,
stand.
Stare decisis, then, calls upon courts to heed legal fictions and legal myths and thereby uphold disjunctions introduced in the past.
Whereas justiciability doctrine preserves the interpretive status quo by
closing the courthouse doors, stare decisis preserves the interpretive
status quo by confining the permissible interpretive arguments litigants may make before the court. Of course, we might view the Constitution as a living document explicated by judicial decisions. In this
218
219
220
221
222

Kronman, supra note 213, at 1046.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 854–55.
Id. at 854.
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sense, recent history might be more foundational to constitutional
meaning than distant history. Such a view, however, would not render stare decisis an instrument of conjunction rather than disjunction. To affirm past decisions would be to follow an interpretive theory. To follow stare decisis more broadly—and thus affirm past
decisions when one’s view of true constitutional meaning disagrees
with them—would still perpetuate mythology and disjunction.
Stare decisis also calls upon courts to extend existing mythology
and disjunction into new areas of the law. A present dispute may,
upon occasion, mirror a prior dispute in every relevant detail. In
such cases, a court that adheres to a prior holding despite its best
judgment of the merits will preserve the mythology and disjunction
introduced by the prior court. Many other disputes, however, will
present similar yet distinct legal issues. The combination of stare decisis, analogical reasoning, and a commitment to coherence pushes
courts to entrench mythology and disjunction in these cases. Inconsistent views of constitutional interpretation, moreover, can yield a
patchwork of precedents dramatically at odds with one another. The
task of reconciling these decisions may call for the introduction of
new mythologies and thereby deepen existing disjunctions.
Perhaps it seems strange to cast stare decisis as contrary to the Enlightenment ideal if the Framers considered it a part of their constitutional order. Suppose you are an originalist and that the Framers
advanced the same utilitarian and deontological arguments often
raised to defend stare decisis today. Stare decisis might represent an
important part of the constitutional mechanism. Why, then, would it
contravene the Enlightenment ideal? Stare decisis allows our constitutional mechanism to consume itself through falsehood. It subjugates true constitutional meaning to considerations external to that
meaning. If we take a wrong turn on the path to constitutional truth,
we might find ourselves no longer bound by the same constitutional
mechanism that validated stare decisis in the first place. In so doing,
we would abandon our initial concern with factual accuracy or con223
ceptual coherence.
C. Retroactivity
Imagine that the Supreme Court recognized an error in a previous decision and, stare decisis notwithstanding, reversed the prior
223

That is, we would no longer be originalists in the relevant sense. Our adherence to stare
decisis would lead us to abandon the interpretive mechanism that legitimated that very
adherence.
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decision. It is not difficult to imagine such a situation. Imagine,
moreover, that the Court did not overrule the prior decision as inconsistent with shifting public understandings. Rather, the Court
said that the decision misconstrues the Constitution now and miscon224
How should the
strued the Constitution when it was decided.
Court’s ruling affect litigants who brought claims under the old law?
Should the new law be applied retroactively to the litigants now before the courts? What about litigants whose claims were already decided under the old law?
At common law, the answer to these questions was fairly straightforward. Indeed, the notion of retroactivity represents a modern
225
The common law constituted an unchanging conconstruction.
stant. If a court misconstrued the law, its decision was wrong. A party
that litigated a case in which the court issued a new interpretation of
the law was subject to the new interpretation. Likewise, parties in the
midst of litigating the same claim when the court overruled past
precedent would be subject to the new rule. A party whose claims
had already been decided, by contrast, would be unable to reap the
226
benefits of the new law. The results of past decisions would be final
under res judicata and subject to very limited collateral attack. For
convicted criminal defendants, habeas jurisdiction rarely allowed re227
litigating portions of the merits.
The logic behind stare decisis seems to cut against both retroactive application of new law to pending litigation and bars against relitigating final decisions subject to discarded law. Stare decisis safeguards the public’s reliance interest in the present law, but
retroactivity frustrates the same interests for pending litigants. Stare
decisis similarly safeguards the public’s interest in intertemporal
equality before the law, but the bar on relitigating final decisions
frustrates this interest for parties subject to a final judgment. In tandem, these doctrines seem to present something of a paradox. If all
litigants should be subject to the law at the time of the alleged harm,
then courts should not apply new rules retroactively to pending liti224

225

226
227

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1999) (“The concept of retroactivity is a relative
newcomer to our jurisprudence.”).
See id. at 1082–83 (describing how the consequence of the declaratory theory of the law is
to eschew the concept of retroactivity).
For a discussion of habeas in the early republic, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 465–74 (1963).
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gants. If all litigants should be subject to the correct law, then courts
should not bar reopening suits by those previously subject to the incorrect law.
This paradox did not take shape in the American legal mind until
228
Two common law forces obscured it
the mid-twentieth century.
from view. First, the notion that the common law represented an unchanging force discerned by the courts rendered a distinction between old law and new law nonsensical. Reliance interests notwithstanding, courts could not apply a past, mistaken view of the law to
pending litigants. If they did, courts would be allowing those litigants
229
to evade the law. Second, common law constraints on collateral review removed most prior litigants from intertemporal concern. With
habeas review limited to jurisdictional questions, courts did not face
the issue of what substantive law should have applied to past decisions. New pronouncements about the law of jurisdiction would have
applied to habeas petitioners, but such changes were relatively rare
230
compared to changes in substantive law.
As each of these forces shifted over time, so did views of retroactivity. If the law could change, it might make sense to honor reliance
interests and apply the law at the time of the harm. With broader
habeas review, moreover, it became thinkable that a court might
break open a final judgment on the basis of the merits. The Supreme
Court took up precisely these possibilities in the 1965 case Linkletter v.
231
Walker. In Linkletter, a habeas petitioner sought to invoke a broader
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule adopted by the Court after his
conviction became final. The Court held that new law applies to cases on direct review and that new law also may apply to cases on collateral review, subject to considerations of fairness and policy. Per Justice Clark, the Court created a three-factor test for said
considerations: whether retrospective application would further the
purpose of the invoked rule, the level of reliance placed upon the
prior rule, and the effect of retrospective application on the admin232
istration of justice.
228
229
230

231
232

For an overview of early discussions of the issue, see Beryl Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–21 (1960).
That is, at common law, the past, mistaken law was simply not the law.
Notably, however, an individual convicted under a statute later deemed unconstitutional
could bring a habeas petition for that reason in the early years of the Republic. Bator,
supra note 227, at 471. As Bator writes, “In an era when law was not ‘made’ but ‘found,’
unconstitutional statutes were thought of as ‘void,’ as nonexistent, in a rather literal way:
they created no law at all.” Id.
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Id. at 629.
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The Linkletter decision garnered widespread criticism.233 Initially,
the Court extended the decision’s retroactivity analysis to habeas re234
view and some portions of civil actions. Linkletter’s three-factor test
would govern retroactive application of new law for each cause of action. Ultimately, however, the decision and its progeny would represent a temporary departure from the common law approach to retroactivity. Behind a series of dissents by Justice Harlan, the Court
235
In the criminal and then civil contexts, it abanreversed course.
236
doned the Linkletter factors for cases on direct review. Whereas these decisions established a hard rule in favor of retroactivity on direct
review, the Court effectively established a hard rule against retroactivity on collateral review. Once again abandoning the Linkletter factors,
the Court recognized two narrow exceptions to the rule against ret237
roactivity governing habeas petitions.
Upon recognizing the paradox in common law retroactivity doctrine, the Supreme Court first eliminated it and then reintroduced it.
The Court’s rationale for eliminating the paradox turned on an aspiration for both correct decisions and intertemporal equality among
litigants. True constitutional meaning, it reasoned, should be ap238
plied to all litigants before the courts. The Linkletter factors, howev233

234

235
236

237

238

See, e.g., Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1975) (observing that “[c]ommentators have had a veritable field day
with” the Linkletter test); Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply
to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 720 (1966) (arguing that “all newly declared
constitutional rights should be given retroactive effect”).
See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100 (1971) (extending a variant of the Linkletter analysis to a civil case to determine the retroactive applicability of a Supreme Court
decision concerning the applicability of state statutes of limitations under federal law);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 294 (1967) (extending the Linkletter analysis to habeas petitions).
For a description of Justice Harlan’s role in this reversal, see Roosevelt, supra note 225, at
1093–97.
See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 90 (1993) (extending the rule in Griffith
to all civil cases); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (holding that “failure to
apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication”).
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). The Court made two exceptions to this
rule. First, new rules should be applied retroactively if they place “primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Id.
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). Second, new rules of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively if they are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and contribute to the accuracy of the verdict. Id. at 311–12 (quoting
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
In exposing the fiction that the overruled decision must “be only a failure at true discovery and was consequently never the law,” Linkletter aspired to devise a system that applied
the proper law in a given case, whether it be a notion of the law since abandoned or a notion of the law rejecting some past notion of the law. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623.
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er, set limits on the applicability of true constitutional meaning. The
Court’s test promised intertemporal equality, but it raised the possibility of applying visions of the Constitution rooted in falsehood.
Although the Court in Linkletter focused on questions of purpose and
reliance, the third factor, concerning administration, loomed large.
If the Court had found that the habeas petitioner in Linkletter could
apply the new law, it would have faced thousands of similar petitions.
239
It is not surprising that the Court ruled the other way.
The Court did not view its subsequent retreat from Linkletter as reintroducing the paradox described above. Rather, it denied the
presence of the paradox in the first place. Behind Justice Harlan, the
Court revived an earlier, narrower vision of habeas that would not
permit courts to reassess most constitutional claims on collateral re240
Under this view, habeas petitioners may invoke subsequent
view.
decisions only rarely. Parties on direct review, by contrast, may not
justify departures from the mandates of the Constitution by virtue of
reliance interests. Accordingly, the Court’s reversal reinstated a
common law notion of retroactivity; intertemporal concerns about
equality between prior litigants and present or future litigants seldom
arise because habeas seldom implicates substantive constitutional
questions. When habeas does implicate substantive constitutional
questions, the Court has rarely allowed retroactive application of the
241
law.
Both of the Court’s approaches contravene the Enlightenment
ideal. Consider first the Linkletter regime. The Court’s three-factor
test allowed concerns about reliance interests and administrative
burdens to outweigh constitutional truth. That is, for cases on direct
and collateral review, Linkletter justified the continued application of
law deemed to be riddled with mythology and disjunction. Now, consider the post-Linkletter regime. Although parties on direct review are
subject to true constitutional meaning, those on collateral review remain, with few exceptions, bound by law once again riddled with mythology and disjunction. Whether a reviewing court views its role as
239

240

241

See Roosevelt, supra note 225, at 1091 (describing the Linkletter result as “almost inevitable” because otherwise there would have been “an avalanche of habeas petitions and new
trials”).
For an overview of the tightening of habeas jurisdiction since the 1970s, see Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the
Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
587, 609–18 (2005).
For a postmortem on the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence in cases where habeas petitioners sought to apply new rules of criminal procedure, see Note, Rethinking Retroactivity,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1642, 1652–56 (2005).
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engaging the constitutional merits or addressing narrower jurisdictional issues, petitioners must endure a legal standard recognized as
242
incorrect. Res judicata requirements, moreover, preserve prior decisions based on mistaken views.
It may seem odd to imagine that the courts could reverse final civil judgments on the basis of changed understandings of constitutional
meaning. Yet a commitment to eschew mythology and disjunction
would not require that the courts retroactively apply all new understandings of constitutional truth. Depending on one’s view from Sinai, constitutional meaning might legitimately change over time; if
that were so, both the law applied in prior cases and the law applied
in current cases would be correct. The cases at issue here are those
in which a new understanding of constitutional truth casts doubt on
their propriety as decided. Even for this smaller set of cases, the administrative burdens of reopening final judgments would be enormous. Surely, moreover, at some point we may prefer that the law be
243
final rather than correct; uncertainty hinders our ability to plan for
the future in both personal dealings and economic enterprises.
For the Enlightenment ideal, however, these are secondary concerns at best. The tenets of Enlightenment do not permit departures
from true constitutional meaning, convenient or otherwise. Yet retroactivity doctrine has accepted such departures as a matter of convenience, perhaps even of necessity. Suppose that the Framers considered res judicata and non-retroactivity for collateral attack a vital
piece of their constitutional mechanism. This does not change the
fact that in many cases, these doctrines undermine the Enlightenment project of eschewing mythology and disjunction. Although
non-retroactivity does not obstruct efforts to realize constitutional
truth in future decisions, it preserves the interpretive failures that afflicted the past. In so doing, it gives past mythology and disjunction
continued influence in the future.
D. Dicta and Writing Separately
The preceding common law doctrines each preserve mythology
and disjunction in constitutional adjudication. The structure of
common law judicial decisions, moreover, institutionalizes and legitimates those forces. This Part focuses on two common law phenom242
243

That is, a legal standard recognized as incorrect within a given constitutional theory.
As Justice Jackson eloquently put this preference, “[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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ena that illustrate this point: (1) the distinction between holding and
dicta, and (2) the practice of writing separately. Although common
law courts were ostensibly called upon to decide the legal issues necessary to resolve the dispute at hand, they often reached other issues
244
as well. Courts composed of more than one judge, moreover, spoke
in more than one voice; common law practice allowed each judge to
245
deliver his opinion. Under the rule of stare decisis, both practices
required subsequent courts to distinguish between binding law and
merely instructive statements.
Each of these decisional doctrines has long been a part of our
constitutional structure. Begin with writing separately. In the Early
Republic, Chief Justice Marshall labored to eliminate the English
practice of judicial opinions issued ad seriatim, consistently delivering
246
decisions for a unanimous Court. He proved unable to cement this
practice in the face of public criticism and dissenting justices, per247
In the years hence, separate
haps most notably Justice Johnson.
opinions have been a consistent presence in judicial practice. Unlike
their English predecessors, however, American courts have followed
Marshall’s call for a consistent judicial voice. When composed of
multiple members, courts aspire to produce a single opinion for a
248
Plurality opinions garner consistent criticism.249 It is acmajority.
cepted, though, that single members of the court may write separately to concur or dissent in the reasoning or the result.
The distinction between holding and dicta recognized by American courts has similarly deep roots. In theory, the doctrine of stare
decisis could call upon courts to defer, in the sense described above,
to all legal conclusions reached by prior courts. At common law,
however, stare decisis only attached to those conclusions essential to

244
245

246
247
248

249

Indeed, the emergence of a distinction between holding and dicta illustrates that courts
often opined on matters subsequent courts would deem inessential.
See M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 292–303 (describing the British and early American practice of
delivering judgments seriatim).
For an overview of Chief Justice Marshall’s effort in this regard, see Charles F. Hobson,
Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1442–50 (2006).
See generally PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 20–40
(1969).
In recent years, for example, Chief Justice Roberts has invoked the practice of the Marshall Court in asserting that his fellow Justices “should all be worried, when they’re writing separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.” JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 7–8 (2006).
For an extreme view, see, for example, John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 86 (stating that the “evil inherent in decision by plurality is not a minor one”).
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the elements of a prior decision reached by a majority of the court.250
In a regime governed by seriatim opinions, the task of distinguishing
holding from dicta requires a careful reading of each of the opinions
issued by the court. Plurality opinions require modern courts to engage in this type of analysis, but majority opinions make dividing
holding from dicta more straightforward. The presumption against
seriatim practice in our constitutional regime helps ease the task of
distinguishing the essential elements of a decision from the inessen251
tial elements.
Both of these common law forces envision legal interpretation as
an iterative and uncertain enterprise. In a sense, the distinction between holding and dicta combines the rationales underlying justiciability doctrine and stare decisis. Although courts are bound by past
decisions, they are only bound by those elements of past decisions
252
That is,
thought to be within the bounds of judicial competence.
courts defer to past decisions only insofar as they resolve a confined
and concrete dispute. The distinction between holding and dicta
valorizes the notion that the law contains vast tracts of uncharted territory. Courts may opine about the contours of the law governing abstract disputes, but their opining does not bind with the force of law.
The true content of the law, then, comes into view gradually but never completely. The path to that content is borne of restraint; no
253
court may bind all others with its vision of true legal meaning.
The practice of writing separately reinforces the value of iteration
and uncertainty expressed in the distinction between holding and
dicta. In a practical sense, signed opinions may improve the judicial
254
work product by making judges accountable for their work. More

250

251

252

253
254

Although the definition of dicta may be simply stated, what constitutes an “essential” part
of the prior decision is subject to serious debate. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005) (providing a comprehensive framework for distinguishing holding from dicta); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (1994) (discussing the “jurisprudential implications of Article III
for determining how federal courts ought to distinguish between the holdings and dicta
of past cases”).
Of course, this presumption can only get us so far. We still encounter elaborately fractured opinions upon occasion. Consider, for example, the multiple majorities present in
Regents of the Univ.of Cal.v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
See Dorf, supra note 250, at 2053 (arguing that the distinction between holding and dicta
helps “confin[e] the lawmaking authority of the courts to areas of their institutional
competence”).
For an articulation of this view, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term—
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35–36 (1996).
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 139 (1990)
(“Disclosure of votes and opinion writers may nourish a judge’s ego, his or her sense of
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commonly, however, defenders of the practice invoke the power of
separate opinions to promote judicial dialogue. To be persuasive,
majority opinions must grapple with competing views. A majority of
the court, moreover, may be willing to temper its decision to avoid
255
the cloud of concurrence or dissent. The practice of writing separately does not only promote dialogue in individual cases; it also
promotes dialogue between courts over time. In many cases, concurrences and dissents call upon future courts to cast aside stare decisis
and correct the majority’s departure from the true path. The law
256
may be wrong today, but through iteration, it can work itself clean.
Though ubiquitous, neither of these common law traditions has
garnered universal acclaim. Criticism of the distinction between
holding and dicta invariably turns to criticism of stare decisis. I am
unaware of any scholars who contend that common law courts should
afford equal deference to holding and dicta. To afford such deference to dicta would render present courts beholden to the whims of
257
Rather, scholars tend to criticize the prevalence of
prior courts.
dicta in judicial opinions. Regardless of one’s definition of dicta, it is
often difficult to distinguish in practice between necessary and extraneous elements of a judicial decision. A liberal disposition toward
dicta, therefore, poses two dangers. First, it may allow courts to ob258
scure the true grounds of a legal decision. Second, it may mislead
259
subsequent courts into misstating and misapplying the law. Both of
these concerns call for minimal use of dicta rather than its abandonment.

255

256
257

258

259

individuality; but if our system affords the judge personal satisfaction, it also serves to
hold the individual judge accountable.”).
See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986) (“[T]he
dissent is often more than just a plea; it safeguards the integrity of the judicial decisionmaking process by keeping the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences
of its decision.”).
See id. at 432 (describing how Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy “spoke not only to his
peers, but to his society, and, more important, across time to later generations”).
Of course, civil courts afford equal deference to holding and dicta in that they afford no
precedential value to either. See MERRYMAN, supra note 184, at 48–51 (observing that, in
contrast to common law systems, certainty in civil-law systems may not be achieved “by giving force of law to judicial decisions”). The point here is that once we afford deference
to prior decisions, a “first in time” rule for judicial pronouncements could encourage
judges to decide issues merely to bind their colleagues.
See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1411 (1995) (“[T]he core ruling of an opinion can be obscured or buried in too much talk, not keyed directly into the holding [itself].”).
See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Administrative Law, 67 YALE L.J. 240,
249 (1957) (noting the “proclivity of ambitious dicta to mislead rather than illuminate”).
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Separate opinions have received more trenchant criticism. Much
like liberal use of dicta, seriatim opinions obscure the rationale governing a particular case and increase the likelihood that subsequent
260
The single judicial
courts will reach a mistaken view of the law.
voice found in civil-law traditions promotes a view of the law as determinate and uncontroversial. Separate opinions dramatize the possibility that reasonable minds may differ on legal meaning. This may
261
be desirable for promoting dialogue about law. However, the splintering of a court invites comparisons between law and politics. As the
Supreme Court reverses and re-reverses itself in opinions distinguishable only by the Court’s membership, one may begin to doubt that
262
true legal meaning exists at all. At the least, the fact that a concurrence or dissent may be vindicated down the road indicates that the
263
prevailing view of legal meaning may be leading us astray.
Consider these criticisms in the language of mythology and disjunction. The distinction between holding and dicta acknowledges
that courts may stray from our visions of true constitutional meaning.
Of course, the distinction seeks to insulate future decisions from this
outcome. Yet the acceptance of dicta in the first place legitimates
mythology and disjunction. Even though it is not governing law, dicta may introduce misunderstanding into the stream of the law. Dicta
may obscure mythology and disjunction within an opinion, and it
may promote such mythology and disjunction in succeeding opinions. Surely, dicta may clarify the law, even if it is not itself the law.
Moreover, the nature of legal exposition makes it difficult to imagine
that each thought in an opinion could be necessary to the holding.
Yet the role of dicta in our constitutional order goes far beyond these
justifications.
The practice of writing separately also acknowledges that courts
may stray from true constitutional meaning. When a plurality opin260
261

262

263

See Henderson, supra note 245, at 298–99 (discussing the propensity for confusion that
accompanies seriatim practice).
See generally Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J.
2235 (1996) (asserting that the practice of writing dissents can be justified on the
grounds of political legitimacy).
In this sense, even a single fractured decision, like Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), has
the power to seriously damage the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court. See Jack
M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407,
1450–58 (2001) (arguing that Bush v. Gore could harm the Court’s legitimacy in the shortterm, but that the Court would probably recover in the long-term).
The “great dissenter” is a recurrent figure in our constitutional story; constitutional
wrong-turns enter something of a constitutional “anti-canon,” whereas dissents warning of
the wrong-turn enter the canon. See generally Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and
Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998) (discussing the “canonization” of dissents).
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ion obscures the holding of a case or yields mistaken views of the law
in subsequent cases, it advances mythology and disjunction. When a
court issues a majority opinion, separate opinions often charge that
the majority opinion rests on mythology and disjunction. In such instances, separate opinions cannot introduce disjunction; they are not
binding law. They may, however, introduce mythology that produces
disjunction in a subsequent case. Separate opinions may also highlight that some members of a court subscribe to mythology that
would produce disjunction if given legal effect. Indeed, the separate
opinion institutionalizes recognition that the current law may rest on
mythology and disjunction. In seeking to perfect the law of tomorrow, separate opinions raise doubts about the law of today.
To the extent that separate opinions and dicta generate dialogue
about true constitutional meaning, they might reduce the prevalence
of mythology and disjunction on net. Perhaps more importantly,
however, the two common law practices expose mythology and disjunction enshrined by justiciability doctrine, stare decisis, retroactivity
doctrine, and the like. In this sense, separate opinions and dicta
highlight the distance between the Enlightenment ideal and the
common law reality of our constitutional system. This does not mean
that we recognize that distance; we may tell ourselves that the present
mythologies and disjunctions are merely temporary departures from
the truth. Yet it is out in the open for all to see.
IV. THE CULTURE AND THE IDEAL
In the last two Parts, I identified two strands of our constitutional
discourse. First, I argued that constitutional theorists speak in the
language of the Enlightenment ideal. That is, they condemn mythology and disjunction in an effort to discern constitutional truth
and translate it into constitutional meaning. Second, I argued that
constitutional theorists inhabit a constitutional system long pervaded
by the common law culture. That system is quite opposed to the tenets of the Enlightenment ideal; it accepts mythology and disjunction
as necessary elements of legal order. It follows that constitutional
rhetoric about mythology and disjunction does not match the reality
of constitutional practice. Or, to put the point another way, the Enlightenment ideal is itself a form of mythology.
In this Part, I outline three ways in which we might address the
tension between the Enlightenment ideal and the common law culture. First, we might embrace one strand at the expense of the other.
Call this the path of absolutism. Second, we might consciously reject
each strand in favor of a hybrid of the two. Call this the path of rec-
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onciliation. Third, we might preserve a state of conflict like that present in the status quo. Call this the path of contradiction. I argue
that constitutional scholars almost uniformly choose the path of contradiction; they espouse both the Enlightenment ideal and the common law culture without acknowledging or resolving the tension between them. Those who purport to follow the path of absolutism are
not faithful to it, and followers of the path of reconciliation are few
and far between.
A. The Path of Absolutism
A few scholars purport to follow the path of absolutism to either
the common law culture or the Enlightenment ideal. In this Subpart,
I examine two of the scholars most faithful to the path of absolutism
in modern constitutional discourse: Ronald Dworkin and Cass Sunstein. Dworkin’s notion of law as integrity flows in most regards from
the Enlightenment ideal. Sunstein’s notion of judicial minimalism
captures the core of the common law culture. As we will see, even
these exemplars of the absolutist path are not quite absolutist in their
adherence to either the common law culture or the Enlightenment
ideal. Like other scholars inclined toward absolutism, Dworkin and
Sunstein occupy the fringe of constitutional discourse, albeit an oftdiscussed fringe.
Begin with Dworkin. In many ways, Dworkin’s notion of constitutionalism echoes the Enlightenment project championed by the
Framers. The task of the interpreter is to uncover the natural constitution of the political body. Or, to use Dworkin’s words, the task for
the interpreter is to divine “the principles of justice, fairness, and
procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpreta264
tion of the community’s legal practice.” The range of permissible
interpretations, however, is limited by familiar constraints. First, the
interpreter must arrive at constitutional meaning from first principles
265
Second, the interpreter may only
rather than policy or intuition.
reach first principles that “fit” the facts that underlie her legal or266
Third, the route to principle as opposed to policy rests in a
der.

264
265
266

DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 225.
For a discussion of this distinction, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82–
88 (1977).
Dworkin introduces this concept in the context of constitutional adjudication. See id. at
106 (arguing that an interpreter must look to constitutional rules and settled practices to
see which of a set of competing constitutional theories “provides a smoother fit with the
constitutional scheme as a whole”). For a general discussion, see DWORKIN, Law’s
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test of coherence, or what Dworkin has called “articulate consisten267
cy.” Let us unpack these three requirements further.
Dworkin’s effort to distinguish between policy and principle recalls Wechsler’s aspiration for neutral principles of constitutional law.
Whereas arguments of policy seek to protect a “collective goal of the
community as a whole,” arguments of principle demonstrate that a
268
decision “secures some individual or group right.” The latter form
of argument can only succeed when “the principle cited can be
shown to be consistent with earlier decisions not recanted, and with
decisions that the institution is prepared to make in . . . hypothetical
269
Dworkin’s Hercules must begin this project anew
circumstances.”
with each dispute before him; the pursuit of first principles never
ceases. Of course, a perpetual return to first principles begs the question of constraint. An interpreter might encounter a plethora of viable first principles. Dworkin’s initial response lies in morality; the in270
terpreter, he says, is to justify our legal order so that it is best.
Surely, abstract morality is not much of a constraint. Beneath
Dworkin’s appeal to morality, however, rests a set of more specific requirements concerning factual accuracy and conceptual coherence.
As to fact, Dworkin requires that interpretive conclusions follow from
the facts underlying the interpreter’s political community. Hercules
may not impose upon that community his own view of a desirable
constitutional order; his theory must justify existing “political history”
271
As to coherence,
and perpetuate existing “community morality.”
Dworkin reads a requirement of global coherence into his notion of
first principles. Each decision must be consistent with a “comprehen-

267

268
269
270

271

EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 227–28 (“History matters because that scheme of principle must
justify the standing as well as the content of these past decisions.”).
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 265, at 88 (arguing that consistency
“means consistency in the application of the principle relied upon, not merely in the application of the particular rule announced in the name of that principle”).
Id. at 82.
Id. at 88.
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 225–27 (laying out Dworkin’s theory of “law
as integrity,” which “insists that legal claims are interpretive judgments and therefore
combine backward-and-forward-looking elements; they interpret contemporary legal
practice seen as an unfolding political narrative”); DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note
44, at 7–12 (asserting that a “moral reading asks [judges] to find the best conception of
constitutional moral principles”). “According to law as integrity,” Dworkin writes, “propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness,
and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the
community’s legal practice.” DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 225.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 265, at 113, 125–26.
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sive theory” of the law, a “seamless web” of legal meaning.272 This is a
broad requirement; Hercules must uncover principles “that fit, not
only the particular precedent to which some litigant directs his attention,” but all other judicial decisions and statutes in his jurisdiction
“so far as these must be seen to be generated by principle rather than
273
policy.”
In some realms, Dworkin’s theory eschews the mythology and disjunction of the common law culture. Take precedent. For Dworkin,
interpreters must account for past decisions in their efforts to divine
a coherent legal system. Past decisions, however, do not bind interpreters in the manner of common law stare decisis. Precedent informs interpretive efforts to ensure consistency and coherence; it
274
Dworkin argues
does not foreclose inquiries into legal meaning.
that a theory that “designates part of what is to be justified as mistak275
It follows that
en is prima facie weaker than one that does not.”
Hercules must show that an interpretive theory that casts past decisions as mistaken “is nevertheless a stronger justification than any alternative that does not recognize any mistakes, or that recognizes a
276
different set of mistakes.” In this sense, precedent checks the personal convictions of the interpreter, but not her inquiry into first
principles, factual accuracy, and structural coherence.
In other realms, however, Dworkin’s theory leaves open the possibility of mythology and disjunction. Hercules would probably decry
much of justiciability doctrine as unprincipled, but Dworkin does not
engage the topic. He emphasizes that judges must respect institutional role, but it is not clear whether that role incorporates a common law notion of adjudication. Dworkin implies that it does, noting
that Hercules must sometimes accept “substantive inconsistency to
keep faith with more procedural principles” given the “complex
277
character of adjudication.” Dicta and the practice of writing separately seemingly raise the same possibility, yet Dworkin also does not
engage them overtly. In the case of retroactivity, Dworkin is a more
explicit apologist for mythology and disjunction. He claims that law

272
273
274

275
276
277

Id. at 87, 116. Given the difficulty of this task, Dworkin quips, “You will now see why I
called our judge Hercules.” Id. at 116.
Id.
In perhaps the most prominent discussion of the place of precedent in his theory,
Dworkin analogizes the judge to the writer of a chapter in a chain novel. See DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 228–38.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 265, at 122.
Id.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 402.
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as integrity dictates that decisions are correct as decided and thereby
278
ignores whether they should ever be revisited.
Let us turn to Sunstein. Whereas Dworkin exalts theory, Sunstein
exalts what we might call anti-theory. For him, the task of interpretation is not one driven by the promise of first principles or a particular
type of constitutional clarity. The “judicial mind,” he argues, “naturally gravitates away from abstractions and toward close encounters
279
with particular cases.” Sunstein has set out to legitimate that disposition, which he locates within the common law tradition. Like Ed280
mund Burke, with whom Sunstein has identified in recent years, he
has developed something of a theory against theory. His argument
does not exhibit the structural coherence of Dworkin’s. Rather, Sunstein’s defense of “judicial minimalism” represents a collection of
281
pragmatic considerations oriented toward stability and order. The
result is an embrace of elements of the common law culture and derision for abstraction in constitutionalism.
Sunstein’s approach to constitutionalism echoes Bickel’s, but it
exhibits important differences. Whereas Bickel envisioned the Supreme Court as uniquely capable of advancing principle, Sunstein
282
distrusts the notion of principle in judicial interpretation. For Sunstein, judicial appeals to principle threaten democratic choice, the
institutional capacities of courts, and social stability more broadly.
Sunstein argues that courts should only decide issues necessary to resolve a case or controversy, and they should justify their decisions
283
with as little abstraction as possible. To use Sunstein’s terms, judi-

278

279
280

281

282
283

For a discussion of the implications of Dworkin’s theory on retroactivity, see generally
Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 369 (1984).
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT, at
xi (1999).
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006) (defending a Burkean approach to constitutional interpretation that he argues is both rooted in
our constitutional system and desirable in instances when originalism produces intolerable results, established traditions are just, and judicial competence is limited).
Sunstein acknowledges, however, that this pragmatism cannot be fully divorced from theory, as “the strongest defenses of judicial minimalism must themselves be theoretical in
character.” SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 248.
According to Sunstein, “Bickel erred in seeing the Court as having a systemically better
understanding of ‘principle,’ than other branches.” Id. at 267 n.5.
Sunstein argues that incompletely theorized agreements “are especially well suited to the
institutional limits of the judiciary, which is composed, in significant part, of multimember bodies, consisting in turn of highly diverse people who must render many decisions, live together, avoid error to the extent possible, and show each other mutual respect.” Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1738
(1995).
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cial decisions usually should be shallow rather than deep and narrow
284
Together, these guidelines leave questions of
rather than wide.
principle to democratic processes, confine judicial inquiry to a manageable scope, and avoid the divisiveness and turmoil that often ac285
companies assertions of first principles.
Although Sunstein attacks reasoning from first principles, he does
not single out the remaining two tenets of the Enlightenment ideal
for criticism. Indeed, his attack on first principles derives its force
from claims that courts construct a more coherent and factually
based constitutional order when they eschew abstraction. Confined
judicial inquiries, he argues, ensure that decisions are grounded care286
Limits on abstraction, he argues, ensure that decifully in facts.
287
sions are consistent with the body of existing law. Yet, in preaching
against theory and breadth, Sunstein implicitly defends some incidence of mythology and disjunction. In leaving things undecided,
courts preserve mythologies that underlie prevailing constitutional
practice. In avoiding abstractions, courts evade inquiries that may reveal mythology. For Sunstein, then, pragmatic concerns suggest that
288
we allow some past falsehoods to persist into the present.
The tools of Sunstein’s judicial minimalism are those of the common law culture. Sunstein does not derive these tools from scratch;
rather, he accepts them as the substance of our legal order. His notion that courts should leave things undecided incorporates the
common law case-or-controversy requirement enshrined in justiciabil289
Stare decisis governs Sunstein’s approach to shallow
ity doctrine.
and narrow decisions; the allure of not deciding rests in that we
290
“must take precedents as fixed points” in our constitutional system.
Sunstein does not engage retroactivity doctrine, yet it is equally central in his conception of constitutional interpretation; once cases are
decided, they become the fixed points of precedent, not to be revisited except under extraordinary circumstances. The practices of writ284

285
286

287
288

289
290

SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 14–22. Sunstein does not argue that
shallowness and depth are always appropriate, but he argues for a strong presumption in
its favor.
See id. at 46–54.
See id. at 252–55 (arguing that “an assessment of facts may well aid in the achievement of
incompletely theorized agreements,” which may “be shallow when they are a product of
an understanding of facts”).
See id. at 255–58.
As Sunstein acknowledges, “If the concern is not the process but the substance—getting
democracy’s content right—it is possible that judicial minimalism will be all wrong.” Id.
at 55.
Id. at 39–40.
Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 283, at 1761.
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ing separately and distinguishing holding and dicta, moreover, receive particular emphasis in Sunstein’s account. These practices, he
argues, function to both highlight deviant judicial overstep and con291
tain its effects moving forward.
Like Dworkin, however, Sunstein does not fully commit to an absolutist vision. He seeks “a presumption rather than a taboo against
292
high-level theorization.” It is not quite clear when Sunstein would
allow courts to turn to first principles. He argues that “fuller theorization—in the form of wider and deeper inquiry into the grounds for
legal judgment—may be valuable or even necessary to prevent incon293
Recently, Sunstein has argued that
sistency, bias, or self-interest.”
courts should neither follow a Burkean commitment to tradition nor
294
follow a rationalist skepticism of tradition. Surely, these claims are
not entirely at odds with traditional common law interpretation;
common law courts change course and synthesize bodies of legal doctrine. Sunstein accepts, however, limits on minimalism that recall the
Enlightenment ideal. He defends an interpretive method that allows
mythology and disjunction, but he also defends departures from that
method for the purpose of eschewing mythology and disjunction.
B. The Path of Reconciliation
As we have seen, Dworkin and Sunstein stray from the path of absolutism. Although both scholars elevate either the common law culture or the Enlightenment ideal, neither elevates his preferred intellectual strand to the complete exclusion of the other intellectual
strand. In so doing, both Dworkin and Sunstein follow one of the
paths competing with absolutism. Sunstein follows the path of reconciliation. His approach to constitutional interpretation selfconsciously blends elements of the common law culture and the Enlightenment ideal. Dworkin, by contrast, follows the path of contradiction. His approach to constitutionalism blends elements of the
common law culture and the Enlightenment ideal, but claims that it
does not. Let us first consider reconciliation.
The idea that we might reconcile the common law culture and the
Enlightenment ideal may seem perplexing. Whereas the Enlighten291
292
293
294

Sunstein singles out the distinction between holding and dicta in his discussion of minimalism. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 4–5.
Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 283, at 1767.
Id. at 1750.
See generally Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 280 (asserting that Burkean minimalism may not be appropriate in the context of constitutional law and should be rejected when traditions are discriminatory).
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ment ideal disallows mythology and disjunction, the common law culture allows them. How can these two strands possibly be reconciled?
Two possibilities come to mind. First, we might segment them. That
is, we might follow the common law culture in some areas of the law
295
and follow the Enlightenment ideal in other areas. This approach
would allow mythology and disjunction, but it would cabin the reach
of the common law culture. Second, and more counter-intuitively,
we might combine them. That is, we might believe that adherence to
the Enlightenment ideal requires adherence to the common law culture. This approach would allow some mythology and disjunction,
but only to further a longer-term project of eschewing deeper mythologies and disjunctions.
Take first the approach of self-consciously employing the Enlightenment ideal and the common law culture in different segments in
our legal order. This is Sunstein’s approach to reconciliation. Sunstein argues that constitutional interpretation should be narrow and
shallow, but he labors to define situations in which width and depth
296
This is an argument for a flexible adherence to
are appropriate.
common law mechanisms that allows the Enlightenment ideal to
trump upon occasion. David Strauss provides a second example of
this flavor of reconciliation. Strauss argues that the common law
method defines the contours of our constitutional system, but only
up to a point. The constitutional text, he argues, grounds constitutional discourse in both some notion of principle and some level of
concreteness. For Strauss, the text “serves as a convention, a focal
point of agreement” within the chaos of the accumulated wisdom le297
Accordingly, his account
gitimated by the common law method.
balances invocations of principle and common law appeals to settled
practice.

295

296

297

Indeed, the law is not quite as far from this state of affairs as it may seem at first glance.
Antitrust law, for example, is something of an island of the Enlightenment ideal. See, e.g.,
Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187, 187 (2000) (arguing that antitrust law nimbly returns to
questions of economic first principle rather than taking a “wooden approach” to economic reasoning).
See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 57 (arguing that “it is worthwhile to
attempt a broad and deep solution (1) when judges have considerable confidence in the
merits of that solution, (2) when the solution can reduce costly uncertainty for future
courts and litigants, (3) when advance planning is important, and (4) when a maximalist
approach will promote democratic goals either by creating the preconditions for democracy or by imposing good incentives on elected officials”).
David Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717,
1732 (2003).
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Now, take the approach of combining the ideal and the culture.
The leading proponent of this view is Bickel. For Bickel, the common law culture enables the Supreme Court to safeguard aspirations
of Enlightenment. Bickel would not have framed his views this way;
like Sunstein, he ultimately grounded his constitutional theory in
298
Burkeanism. In The Least Dangerous Branch, however, Bickel did not
disclaim a place for the tenets of Enlightenment. Instead, he argued
299
that the pursuit of principle must fail if it is a slave to itself. Bickel’s
famous “passive virtues” describe a form of adherence to common law
300
While these instruments are “not
instruments of minimalism.
themselves principled,” Bickel argues, they allow the Court to render
301
Prudence,
“principled adjudications” when it chooses to decide.
not principle, must determine the path of adjudication; principle is a
302
“universal guide,” but it is not a “universal constraint.” To achieve
principle in the long run, then, we must employ non-principle.
As these examples suggest, the path of reconciliation is trod pri303
marily by those disposed toward the common law culture. The Enlightenment ideal does not provide the same leeway for compromise;
it speaks of fixed principles, whereas the common law culture’s
commitment to muddling through is spread across a range of pragmatic doctrines. Yet, even among those disposed toward the common law culture, the path of reconciliation is not a popular one.
Sunstein claims that his theory of constitutional interpretation describes the analysis genuinely employed by courts. This ignores, however, the Enlightenment rhetoric that has long accompanied our
constitutional enterprise. Courts may proceed in a manner consistent with Sunstein’s theory, but their language is more complicated; oftentimes, it is hardly the language of reconciliation. The same
applies to scholarly visions of constitutional interpretation. Our con298
299

300
301
302
303

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3 (1975) (identifying with eighteenthcentury Whigs and Edmund Burke).
BICKEL, supra note 53, at 244 (arguing that “the rule of principle in our society is neither
precipitate nor uncompromising, that principle may be a universal guide but not a universal constraint, that leeway is provided to expediency along the path to, and alongside
the path of, principle, and, finally, that principle is evolved conversationally not perfected
unilaterally”).
See id. at 111–18 (discussing mechanisms for avoiding decision, including standing doctrine, ripeness doctrine, and the related political-question doctrine).
Id. at 205.
Id. at 244.
See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court 1994 Term—Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 13, 16 (1995) (arguing that we should be wary of “calls to examine, or reexamine,
first principles” that “raise the specter or embrace the exhilaration of radical rethinking”).

1440

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:5

stitutional discourse does not sound in reconciliation, but rather in
contradiction.
In a sense, this is not surprising. Effectively segmenting the common law culture and the Enlightenment ideal is an unenviable task.
Sunstein advances a series of factors to consult as to whether a return
304
to first principles is appropriate. It is difficult to imagine a satisfying way to segment these two traditions in a manner that is not just
weakly suggestive, like Sunstein’s. Vagueness yields an imprecise division, and an imprecise division reproduces the contradiction. Similarly, Bickel’s notion that principle requires unprincipled behavior
does violence to deep-seated Enlightenment values about transparency and coherence. Few scholars have defended his view of prudence,
305
and many have lined up to criticize it. Moreover, both approaches
highlight an unsettling contradiction long associated with our understanding of constitutionalism. Accordingly, the contradiction persists, albeit largely hidden from view.
C. The Path of Contradiction
Like Sunstein, Dworkin describes his interpretive theory as the
analysis genuinely employed by courts. Sunstein argues that, contrary
to the public imagination, courts do not rely on theory in constitu306
Dworkin argues that, again contrary to the
tional interpretation.
307
public imagination, courts do not ignore theory. One might wonder how the public could hold such contradictory notions of constitutional interpretation. Yet there is indeed contradiction in how scholars and courts navigate the boundaries between the common law
culture and the Enlightenment ideal. It is not merely that the culture
and the ideal have coexisted since the Founding. The two traditions
have been apparent within the theories of constitutional meaning espoused by most participants in constitutional discourse. That is, the
Enlightenment ideal does not emerge as a myth solely upon viewing
304

305
306
307

SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 57 (looking to (1) judicial confidence
in the merits, (2) whether a broad and deep decision would reduce costly uncertainty, (3)
whether advance planning is important, and (4) whether a broad and deep decision
would advance democratic goals).
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
Sunstein argues that, “as a general rule, those involved in constitutional law tend to be
cautious about theoretical claims.” SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at xi.
According to Dworkin, “[l]awyers and judges, in their day-to-day work, instinctively treat
the Constitution as expressing abstract moral requirements that can only be applied to
concrete cases through fresh moral judgments.” DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note
44, at 3. He argues, however, that “it would indeed be revolutionary for a judge openly to
recognize the moral reading.” Id.
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our constitutional system as a whole; it emerges within nearly every
theory of constitutional meaning that makes up that system.
To see this, begin again with the Marshall Court. Amidst Marshall’s rhetoric about reasoning to constitutional truth, lay the assumption that adjudication should follow the common law model.
The Court invoked antecedents of justiciability doctrine, traditional
notions of precedent, the distinction between holding and dicta, and
308
the practice of writing separately. In so doing, it likely followed the
“poorly-digested farrago of ideas, without inner logic,” that animated
309
Under many interpretive theories, the Court’s emthe Framers.
brace of common law mechanisms was less a choice than a require310
Requirement or not, the result combined Enlightenment
ment.
rhetoric and common law constraints. The Court simultaneously
promoted and assailed mythology and disjunction. It championed an
abstract notion of constitutional principle while simultaneously restricting its ability to recognize and affirm that principle.
The notions of maintenance advanced by mid-nineteenth century
theorists also betray an uneasy mingling of the tenets of Enlightenment and the dictates of the common law culture. In his Commentaries, for example, Justice Story located the “permanent principles”
of constitutional government in common law notions of “[o]ur an311
He did not explain why the common law would ensure
cestors.”
such principles, nor did he contend, like Bickel, that genuine principle demands short-term departures from principle. Similarly, John
Norton Pomeroy both invoked first principles to reach “the
312
truth . . . of the meaning of the Constitution” and derided “imprac313
Modern descendticable theorist[s]” that would do such a thing.
ents of these thinkers follow a similar pattern. Justice Scalia invokes
308

309
310

311
312
313

See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405 (1821) (stating that the case-orcontroversy requirement in Article III limits the judicial power to “‘a case in law or equity,’ in which a right, under such law, is asserted in a Court of justice”); Alexander v. Balt.
Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 370, 379–82 (1808) (declining to follow dicta); Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 87–90 (1807) (invoking stare decisis). For a discussion of the
practice of writing separately in the Marshall Court, see supra notes 246–249 and accompanying text. I do not mention retroactivity because that issue did not arise for the Marshall Court given its Blackstonian view of the law. See supra notes 225–227 and accompanying text.
Whitman, supra note 217, at 1367–68.
That is, for theories that rely on some notion of original understanding, it would appear
that the Marshall Court acted appropriately in implementing that understanding. Of
course, this quickly becomes something of a Pandora’s box. Which common law mechanisms did the Framers agree upon? What would have constituted agreement? And so on.
1 STORY, supra note 116, at § 377.
POMEROY, supra note 117, at § 148.
Id. at § 140.
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original intent as true constitutional meaning, but he confines his in314
quiries such that he often cannot reach that meaning.
The opposite pattern emerges among adherents to accounts of
constitutional growth. Although these theorists embrace the common law culture, they ground that embrace in Enlightenment rhetoric. For Sidney George Fisher, the limits of human reason suggest
that “the only safe foundation for government is custom” and gradu315
alism. He seeks to legitimate this view through what is, in essence,
an appeal to the first principles of the Founding. Fisher finds that
the first principles of the Founding disclaimed first principles: “Our
ancestors,” he argues, “followed the English model as closely as they
316
dared, not perhaps as closely as they wished.” C.G. Tiedeman and
Woodrow Wilson similarly defend a system of common law growth on
the grounds that it is dictated by the essence of our national charac317
While these theorists invoke Enlightenment rhetoric in dister.
cerning constitutional meaning, their conclusions eschew the Enlightenment ideal for the common law culture. They call upon us to
follow their prescriptions, but not their pattern of inquiry. Indeed,
they ignore the tension between these two strands.
Consider once again the rise and fall of Lochner. Although the
judges that would enshrine Lochner invoked first principles, they did
not do so in every case or with respect to every issue. Their decisions
very much inhabited the common law culture. To employ a frame
advanced by Richard H. Fallon, Lochner represents an “extraordinary
case” in the sense that the Court saw it as a case that required an in318
Yet, in
quiry into first principles of constitutional governance.
many “ordinary cases,” the Court carried the torch of traditional
314

315
316
317

318

It is in this sense that Scalia is a “faint-hearted originalist.” Scalia, supra note 50, at 864.
Not only does Scalia ignore original intent in some instances given his moral intuitions, as
he acknowledges, but he also prevents himself from engaging a full inquiry into original
intent.
FISHER, supra note 120, at 17.
Id. at 24.
See TIEDEMAN, supra note 122, at 16 (“The constitution of a state may be described as the
definition of the order and structure of the body politic, while constitutional law consists
of those fundamental principles and rules in accordance with which the government is
constructed and orderly administration is conducted. Constitutional law may be described as the anatomy and physiology of the body politic.”); WILSON, supra note 123, at 4
(arguing that “the right of those who are governed to adjust government to their own
needs and interests” is demonstrated in the Declaration of Independence).
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 60 (1997). Fallon distinguishes between “ordinary” cases in
which “the Court applies the framework established by prior decisions” and “extraordinary” cases in which the Court turns to a “fresh examination of underlying ‘first principles’” to address the issue. Id. at 60–61
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common law adjudication, invoking stare decisis, minimalism, and
319
the like. The New Deal decisions that overturned Lochner follow the
same pattern. As it reversed course, the Court spoke of transcendent
principle. Yet it did not really return to first principles. Rather, it left
most of the existing constitutional superstructure both intact and un320
questioned. In these two shifts, the Court did little to explain the
line between an ordinary case and an extraordinary one. Rather, it
proceeded as if the two genres of cases were one and the same: a
product of longstanding principle.
Post-war constitutional theorists betray the same disconnect between rhetoric and reality. Although Herbert Wechsler’s pursuit of
neutral principles evokes the language of Enlightenment, Wechsler
carefully noted that it could not displace common law notions of
precedent. Adherence to precedent need not hinder the task of pursuing neutral principles; precedent may play a role in assessing neutrality in much the same way it plays a role in Dworkin’s notion of integrity. Yet Wechsler does not make this argument. Instead, he
merely cites Holmes’ remark that “imitation of the past, until we have
a clear reason for change, no more needs justification than appe321
tite.” John Hart Ely reproduces a comparable dynamic. Ely reasons
to a vision of constitutional meaning that sounds in the Enlightenment ideal, yet he expresses concern about projects that seek to uncover fundamental principles. The result at once appeals to abstract
reason and denigrates claims that “have the smell of the lamp about
322
Neither theory negotiates a relationship between culture
them.”
and ideal; both leave their tension unacknowledged.
Contemporary theorists espouse the Enlightenment ideal while
tacitly advancing the common law culture. Return to Ackerman and
Michelman. Ackerman has self-consciously taken up the cause of Enlightenment. The Framers, he says, “were hardly content with the
323
Burkean arts of muddling through crises.” Through the notion of
extra-textual amendment, Ackerman repackages the apparent contradictions of our constitutional order into a coherent system dominated by the will of the people. Still, his account does not fully es319

320
321
322
323

Indeed, these strands are the substance of Justice Holmes’ famous dissent in Lochner. See
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases”).
For one of the most far-reaching accounts of the New Deal revolution, see 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 255–311 (1998).
Wechsler, supra note 52, at 17 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Holdsworth’s English Law,
in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 285, 290 (1920)).
ELY, supra note 137, at 59.
1 ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 20.
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chew the “muddling through” of the common law culture. The people may speak outside of Article V, but courts interpret their utter324
In many
ances subject to the forces of common law adjudication.
ways, Michelman echoes Dworkin in his devotion to principle, albeit
through dialogue. For him, “[e]very norm, every time, requires explanation and justification in context” through the “practical reason”
325
Like Dworkin, however, Michelman does little to adof dialogue.
dress common law adjudication or how it may confine the dialogue
326
he describes.
A clear picture emerges: constitutional theorists promote the Enlightenment ideal as a legal myth. A study of nearly any opinion interpreting the Constitution reveals that courts are hardly engaged in
the enterprise of discerning transcendent constitutional meaning.
Behind the court’s discussion, lies a vast landscape of assumptions it
refuses to engage. The litigants know that they may not question that
landscape; they make their cases within the confines of the common
law culture. Scholars dissect cases within those confines. Yet, when it
comes to abstract discussions of constitutional meaning, rhetoric does
not match reality. The falsehood of the Enlightenment ideal, once
uncovered, is readily apparent. But, like the myth that law follows
rules, the Enlightenment ideal reflects a desire transformed into be327
lief. It is not advanced as a convenient falsehood; it is advanced as a
precondition for intelligent discourse about constitutional meaning.

324
325
326

327

See id. at 86–99 (describing the process of intergenerational synthesis).
Michelman, supra note 54, at 76.
Michelman locates the common law culture within the nomos of our constitutional culture. He states
Judicial self-government, like all self-government, can occur only within a nomos, a
cognizable normative universe that makes integrity conceivable. In our judicial
nomos there are strong norms of popular sovereignty, intragovernmental division
of responsibility, and justice to parties—all of which demand attention to statutes,
regulations, constitutional texts, precedents, and other embodiments of history.
Id. In the next breath, however, he states that “[t]he norm of justice to parties itself
commands that no other norm should ever take a form that preempts questions or exempts reason-giving.” Id. In this statement, Michelman affirms the Enlightenment ideal.
As Karl Llewlyen argued in 1934, “the theory that rules decide cases seems for a century
to have fooled not only library-ridden recluses, but judges.” Llewelyn, supra note 146, at
7. This desire, he argued, became a belief that altered the reasoning of decisions
[f]or when changes in common law cumulate to the point where even the willful
blind may be expected to perceive the change, some judge rewords ‘the’ rule into
a wholly different rule tailored more neatly to the current course of decision: one
more device to save the face of an insolvent theory.
Id. at 10. Nearly a century later, constitutional theorists continue to warn of the same selfdelusion. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 111–12 (2003).
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This is, no doubt, quite a strange state of affairs. It is not only that
the Court adheres to the common law culture within plain view; stare
decisis, after all, is not a phrase known only to lawyers. The ideological divisions on the Court, aired in recurrent 5-4 decisions in highprofile cases, cast serious doubt on the notion that our constitutional
system is moored to some abstract truth. Yet, as we have seen, doctrines like stare decisis can be employed within a theory of constitutional meaning; ideological divisiveness, moreover, can be blamed on
the ideological opponent: if only they followed true constitutional
meaning, there would not be such divisions. The confirmation process for Supreme Court justices dramatizes these strands. Much is
said of stare decisis and ideology. But these discussions serve as a
protracted effort of disclaiming the plausibility of deep interpretive
328
agreement, restating the myth.
V. THE IDEAL AS BENEFICIAL LEGAL MYTH
Is this state of affairs desirable? Perhaps this seems like the wrong
question. The task of constitutionalism, after all, is to enshrine a constitutive mythology. Good, bad, or otherwise, our constitutive mythology constitutes our constitutional system. This response, however, ignores that arguments about constitutional theory necessarily
329
involve considerations of their consequences. Accordingly, we must
wrestle with the value of maintaining the Enlightenment ideal as a legal myth rather than rendering it a legal fiction, disclaiming it, or
disclaiming the common law culture. This tradeoff is not easily
avoided; after all, the Enlightenment ideal’s status as a legal myth
runs counter to an ideal central to our constitutional discourse: the
Enlightenment ideal.
Although we must question our constitutive mythology, we cannot
ignore it. It is the backdrop against which discussion of our constitutional system takes place. As I have argued, the common law culture
and the Enlightenment ideal are firmly ingrained in our constitutional discourse. Theorists who purport to embrace the Enlightenment ideal still recognize the conversational constraints of the common law culture. Theorists who claim adherence to the common law

328

329

For a telling account, see Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919, 920 (1995) (book review) (arguing that the “nonanswer” discourse employed in
the confirmation processes of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer raise more concerns than the
politicized discourse employed during Robert Bork’s failed confirmation process).
For a discussion of these considerations, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to
Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 537 (1999).
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culture nonetheless invoke Enlightenment to allay concerns that our
constitutional order may take a wrong turn. The few theorists that
have sought to blend these traditions have garnered few followers.
We need not accept the present expression of these patterns of constitutional engagement, but it would be foolish to imagine that we
might change them on a whim.
With this in mind, let us return to each of the three paths described above: absolutism, reconciliation, and contradiction.
Begin with absolutism. From the foregoing, it should be clear that
absolutism is a non-starter; this path wholly rejects our affinity for either the culture or the ideal. Even supposing that such a wholesale
rejection could actually be achieved, moreover, neither the common
law culture nor the Enlightenment ideal is an obvious choice. The
debate between Sunstein and Dworkin illustrates the point. If we
embraced the ideal, we would need to accept considerable legal instability and profound problems of judicial competence. If we embraced the common law culture, we would need to accept falsehood
and inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. Surely, tradeoffs
like these are familiar. Suffice it to say that neither culture nor ideal
is self-evidently superior to the other and neither paints a satisfying
picture in isolation. In light of our collective unease with the absolutist path, it does not seem to be the best choice.
Turn, then, to the path of reconciliation. This path is a nonstarter for many of the same reasons. Neither of the routes to reconciliation described above envisions a genuine exchange between the
culture and the ideal. Sunstein divides the two strands topically; he
sets boundaries by subject matter to govern whether we should follow
culture or ideal. Bickel divides the culture and the ideal temporally;
he defends the culture as a short-term tool that enables us to fulfill
the ideal in the long term. These solutions do not resolve the underlying tension between culture and ideal. Rather, they compartmentalize the two strands. This is understandable; the culture and
the ideal are diametrically opposed and thus defy reconciliation of
any other kind. The trouble with compartmentalization, however, is
that it merely reproduces absolutism within compartments. For reconciliation to work, we must be willing to accept absolutism within
certain boundaries.
So long as we can agree on the rationale for a division, a patchwork of absolutist compartments may be desirable. This would allow
us to reap some benefits of both the culture and the ideal. It is not
clear, however, that we can craft boundaries in a manner that is precise and satisfying. Precision is necessary for genuine compartments;
imprecise divisions will yield conflict at the borders. Boundaries must
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be satisfying so that we can live with them despite our conflicting allegiances to the culture and the ideal. Neither Sunstein nor Bickel
parts culture from ideal with precision; Sunstein advances a vague list
of factors to govern when to invoke first principles, and Bickel does
not elaborate when we should follow principle and when we should
not. Needless to say, neither scholar’s divisions have proved satisfying
to other scholars. This is unsurprising; if there is a satisfying way to
precisely divide the inherently imprecise conflicts between truth and
stability, depth and simplicity, and consistency and expediency, it has
not revealed itself.
This leaves the path of contradiction. The path of contradiction
surely holds some allure; it allows us to reap the benefits of both the
culture and the ideal without needing to navigate compartmentalization. But, this path has difficulties of its own.
Before we address them, let us first divide it into two sub-paths:
that of patent contradiction and that of latent contradiction. This division is straightforward; the patent contradiction is readily apparent
to the public, while the latent contradiction goes undetected. In the
case of the patent contradiction, we might identify the contradiction
in constitutional discourse or we might collectively recognize its presence even as it is nominally denied. That is, the patent contradiction
might be denoted as such or it might be recognized in a manner similar to a legal fiction. In the case of the latent contradiction, the contradiction must evade public notice; it can be neither overtly identified nor implicitly recognized. The latent contradiction, then, evokes
a dynamic similar to the legal myth. Contradiction presents difficulties in both its latent and patent forms.
First, consider patent contradiction. The trouble with this subpath is that it would expose disjunction at the core of most, if not all,
of our theories of constitutional meaning. This is true for theories
that profess allegiance to the Enlightenment ideal as well as theories
that profess allegiance to the common law culture. For theories that
profess allegiance to the Enlightenment ideal, it would expose the
fact that constitutional practice is confined by the common law culture. For theories that profess allegiance to the common law culture,
it would expose the fact that the common law culture is not always so
rigid a constraint. In each case, we would see that the relevant theories do not follow their own commands, at least as the theories conceive of them. For theories that profess allegiance to some combination of the culture and the ideal, this sub-path will also yield
disjunction. There is a difference between reconciliation and contradiction; such theories would thus fail to heed their stated interpretive approach.
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Of course, this sub-path would not expose disjunction in a constitutional theory that called for contradiction. For example, a theory
might demand that we pay obeisance to the Enlightenment ideal but
hew close to the constraints of the common law culture. In such case,
there would be no disjunction; the path of contradiction would be
the path dictated by the constitutional theory. On some level, most
constitutional theories, at least as described here, may seem to follow
this mold. We might say, then, that the path of contradiction would
reveal conjunction rather than disjunction. These theories do not
see themselves as favorable to contradiction, however. That is, they
fail to recognize that they embrace contradiction. According to their
terms, therefore, taking this sub-path would reveal disjunction, not
conjunction. As should be clear from the preceding Parts, I am unaware of any constitutional theory that so embraces contradiction.
Consider an example of this dynamic. Suppose you are an
originalist. You say that you are committed to an Enlightenment-style
inquiry into the intent of the framers. In practice, however, you confine your analysis in accordance with the common law culture. If we
expose this contradiction, we will reveal that your interpretive approach does not follow the mantra it espouses. We would not be revealing a disjunction in the formal criteria your theory employs to resolve a particular case. Rather, we would reveal that you do not
actually advance the constitutional meaning dictated by original intent. We would reveal that you place roadblocks into your analysis
that foreclose the possibility of arriving at that aim. Even if these
roadblocks are consistent with the intent of the Framers, they fore330
close your ability to vindicate their full constitutional vision.
What is so bad about exposing a disjunction like this one? Exposed disjunctions threaten the stability of a legal order for two primary reasons. First, they cast doubt upon the notion that a constitutional system follows an internal system of meaning. If our
constitutional theories do not follow their own demands, we must
begin to ask ourselves whether our constitutional order is anything

330

Justice Scalia acknowledges that
[i]n its undiluted form, at least, [originalism] is medicine that seems too strong to
swallow. Thus, almost every originalist would adulterate it with the doctrine of
stare decisis—so that Marbury v. Madison would stand even if Professor Raoul Berger should demonstrate unassailably that it got the meaning of the Constitution
wrong.
Scalia, supra note 50, at 861. Accordingly, Scalia might respond that the mantra of his
notion of originalism is not original intent but rather originalism with stare decisis. This
belies, however, the rhetoric of originalism: that true constitutional meaning lies in original intent. Scalia’s concern for precedent allows a departure from that meaning.
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more than the bald exercise of power. In this sense, disjunction at331
tacks the bonds that makes constitutionalism possible. Second, exposed disjunctions cast doubt upon the notion that a constitutional
system can follow an internal system of meaning. If a theory cannot
follow its own commands, we must ask ourselves how we can call upon the notion of constitutionalism to bind us together into selfgovernment. If we conceive of constitutionalism as a project that
generates a shared system of meaning, this type of disjunction challenges the notion that constitutionalism could ever be possible, ex332
cept perhaps in the most homogenous of societies.
Now, consider the path of latent contradiction. The great benefit
of the latent contradiction is that it obscures these disjunctions. This
benefit, however, comes at the cost of honesty and transparency.
There are three scenarios in which we would fail to perceive the contradiction between the common law culture and the Enlightenment
ideal. First, we might believe that we follow the common law culture
even though we do not. Second, we might believe that we follow the
Enlightenment ideal even though we do not. Third, we might simply
fail to recognize the tension between our allegiances to the culture
and the ideal. The third scenario may seem the least troubling, as it
appears to rely on ignorance more than delusion. Yet it is also the
least plausible; if unhidden, the contradiction between the culture
and the ideal is hard to ignore. That is, latent contradiction would
333
Accordingly, we
seem to require collective delusion of some sort.
331

332

333

For a discussion of the strands in constitutional discourse that police this division, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” As a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1997). The literature on this division is immense, but the idea is fairly simple:
our constitutional order depends on some understanding that ours is a system “of laws,
and not of men.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). As Fallon
writes, a central element of the modern accounts of the rule of law is that “[p]eople must
be able to understand the law and comply with it.” Fallon, supra, at 8. When a theory
does not follow its own requirements, its account of law detracts from such understanding.
As Robert Cover argues, different communities generate systems of meaning that, “[l]et
loose, . . . would be unstable and sectarian in their social organization, dissociative and
incoherent in their discourse, wary and violent in their interactions.” Cover, supra note 7,
at 16. Constitutionalism polices these interactions, whether it be through a homogenous
hierarchy of values, or by legitimizing sub-communities within a larger framework. Id. at
67–68. Exposed disjunction poses two threats in this regard. First, it challenges the ability of a constitutional order to mediate between the sub-communities and currents that
inhabit a society. Second, it challenges the ability of sub-communities to generate a sustainable system of meaning. Together, these two forces threaten the disintegration of
both the whole and its parts.
Or, at the very least, ignoring the contradiction would require such a cognitive dissonance that in essence we would either be subscribing to one of these false beliefs or subscribing to both of them at different points in time. I do not delve into the possibility
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must consider the tradeoff between false belief in the culture and
false belief in the ideal.
False belief in the common law culture would have few advantages. It would eschew the notion that our constitutional order
rests on first principles. Instead, we would see constitutionalism as an
incremental project of muddling through. There would be no such
thing as a wrong turn, at least as measured against deeper principles
of meaning. In practice, of course, constitutionalism would return to
first principles occasionally. A false belief in the preeminence of the
common law culture would help legitimate these breaks with past
practice, because they would be largely beyond attack once achieved.
Adherence to the common law culture would also allay concerns
about judges rejecting longstanding practices in the name of abstract
notions of constitutional meaning. It is difficult to imagine, however,
that our constitutional system would adopt a false belief in the common law culture given the Founding’s Enlightenment rhetoric. It is
also difficult to imagine that this false belief would not be exposed for
its falsehood. The most recognizable constitutional acts are those
that break with the past.
False belief in the Enlightenment ideal evades these potential pitfalls. The ideal has deep roots in our origin myths. It also compliments our penchant to notice the extraordinary rather than the pedestrian. More than that, false belief in the Enlightenment ideal
carries considerable benefits; namely, it preserves the appearance
that our constitutional order rests on principle. This has two primary
effects. First, it counters concerns that constitutionalism is the bald
exercise of power. The Enlightenment ideal supports the notion that
there is a correct answer to a constitutional question that derives
334
from a consistent theory of meaning. Second, it obscures irreconcilable value conflicts that, if exposed, would cast doubt upon the
possibility of constitutionalism as a collective enterprise. The En-

334

that subscribing to both of these false beliefs at different times might be a better course
than consistently subscribing to one of them. Such fragmented contradiction would be
difficult to discuss cogently; there are so many possible permutations that weighing them
within this calculus would be near impossible. Accordingly, I assess the two extremes of
subscribing to either the common law culture or the Enlightenment ideal as legal myths.
I note here, however, that given my view that the ideal is on balance the better legal myth,
I would imagine that if we advanced each of the legal myths in different contexts, adherence to the ideal as legal myth would generally be preferable.
Although this notion is often seen as quaint if not dangerous, it is a recurrent desire in
our constitutional discourse. For a critique of the idea that there can be a correct answer
to a constitutional question, see, for example, DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS (2002).
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lightenment ideal allows us to believe that apparent rejections of our
core values are mere missteps that fail to capture the true meaning of
335
These two benefits smooth over weakour constitutional system.
nesses in our constitutional order that are threatened by the possibility of exposed disjunction.
As a legal myth, the Enlightenment ideal generates a narrative
that preserves the possibility that a wide array of constitutional viewpoints will be vindicated. When we see a decision that contravenes
our vision of constitutional meaning, we hold out hope that it will be
reversed in short order. We may even enter the courts to ensure that
it is reversed. If time passes and the decision remains binding law, we
may consider either amending the Constitution or amending our
constitutional theory. The decision might cast portions of our theory
into doubt, but it need not cast doubt on the notion of fidelity to
genuine constitutional meaning; vindication is always around the
336
corner. This conviction allows us to preserve both an essential appearance of consistent constitutional meaning and an essential ambiguity in the content of that meaning. Together, these forces enable
constitutional legitimacy amidst profound contestation of constitutional meaning.
Let us pause on the assertion that our constitutional democracy
requires a certain ambiguity. It is fairly uncontroversial that ambiguity is sometimes necessary to strike a compromise between competing
337
viewpoints. The ambiguity I refer to here is more complex, howev-

335

336

337

Guido Calabresi has described this possibility with particular eloquence. In some instances, he writes
one must seek solutions in which—though one set of ideals and beliefs will win the
particular case (that cannot be avoided)—the victory will not reject as invalid or
outside our law the ideals, beliefs, and values (yes, even the metaphysics) of the
losing group. Because such solutions respect both the winning and the losing
metaphysics, they look to a time when it may be possible to accommodate both
sets of beliefs. Even if such a time never comes to be, they serve to place the burden of the immediate result on all of us rather than just on the losers.
GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES
ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 97–98 (1985).
In a sense, the notion of “democratic constitutionalism” is a conscious expression of the
process in which groups affirm their collective hope that true constitutional meaning is
just around the corner. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 375 (2007) (arguing that “[w]hen citizens speak of their most passionately held commitments in the language of a shared constitutional tradition, they invigorate that tradition” such that “even resistance to judicial
interpretation can enhance the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy”).
This does not mean that these legislative compromises are particularly celebrated. See,
e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002)
(defending ambiguous legislative compromises and noting that formal legal doctrine
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er; it encompasses an intertemporal ambiguity. As Calabresi and
Bobbitt have argued, some value conflicts must be obscured from collective consciousness such that the social fabric does not rip apart.
An ambiguous compromise cannot obscure such conflicts so long as
338
it is perceived as a compromise. The Enlightenment ideal preserves
a healthy sense of intertemporal uncertainty. Even if a group believes
an interpretation rejects its most foundational values, the ideal helps
preserve the group’s faith that those values will be vindicated eventually. A decision may expose the conflict, but its conclusions are merely a temporary articulation of a deeper, contested, constitutional
339
A commitment to vindicating true constitutional meanmeaning.
ing binds us together even as irreconcilable value conflicts threaten
340
to tear us apart.
Of course, there are limits to the benefits of the Enlightenment
ideal as legal myth. Although it may help legitimate the constitutional enterprise, the Enlightenment ideal paints the courts as a political
battleground where the battle is never truly won. In this sense, the
Enlightenment ideal may actually threaten the view that our constitutional order is based in principle; it leads us to contest articulations of
341
constitutional meaning. Moreover, given that the common law culture enshrines views we sometimes believe misconstrue true constitutional meaning, it is difficult to ignore that our constitutional order

338

339

340

341

“frames legislative ambiguity as a problem to be solved rather than an opportunity to be
exploited”).
Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that to resolve choices between resource allocations that implicate irreconcilable values, we “must attempt to make allocations in ways that preserve
the moral foundations of social collaboration” in ways that “do[] not appear to implicate
moral contradictions.” CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 166, at 18. However, “unless the
values held in tension have changed, the illusion that denies their conflict gives way and
the transformation will only have been a postponement. When actions are again focused
on the tragic choice, action will again be required.” Id.
In this sense, the Enlightenment ideal achieves precisely what Calabresi calls for in clashes between moral beliefs: it “preserves the moralisms which lose out in the conflict.”
CALABRESI, supra note 335, at 92. It is not only that “the loser may be more willing to accept the loss if losing does not mean that society will become callous to the values he or
she held.” Id. Even the appearance of a final decision, in light of the Enlightenment ideal, may always be subject to question.
To make this cohesion possible, courts must give voice to the rejected constitutional
meanings, such that proponents of the vindicated meaning might reconsider their views.
For an intricate discussion of the way in which the Court can show us how “opportunities
for communal reconciliation might be grasped,” see Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law
and the Teaching of Parables, 93 YALE. L.J. 455, 502 (1984).
And, it leads us to ask, like Charles Fried, if we can place decisions by the Court’s “liberal
and conservative [voting] blocs” within “any coherent set of doctrinal or jurisprudential
principles.” Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 163, 195 (2002).
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does not actually follow the Enlightenment ideal. That realization
threatens to prompt disillusionment with our constitutional process342
Moreover, the temporal ambiguity enabled by the Enlightenes.
ment ideal can only do so much as time passes. Even if we believe
that our view of true constitutional meaning will be vindicated, we
may need to endure such prolonged rejections of a foundational value that it becomes clear that the society we inhabit is no longer of the
343
Constitution to which we adhere.
Perhaps worse, the Enlightenment ideal as legal myth is, nonetheless, a legal myth. In some sense, it is a lie, even if a lie that we turn
344
upon ourselves. For some, rooting out dishonesty may be the first
345
This is a tough position to arpriority, consequences be damned.
gue against. All one can say is that the Enlightenment ideal as legal
myth, dishonesty and all, may be the best way to navigate the tension
between our allegiance to Enlightenment principle and the common
law culture. We can only reach this conclusion through a weighing of
the importance of honesty, so there is no foolproof way to defend the
Enlightenment ideal as legal myth against this attack. A proxy, however, lies in the constitutive mythology we have built around constitutionalism since the Founding and that we continue to build today.
The falsehood inherent within the Enlightenment ideal has been
readily apparent since the Founding. It is the substance of nearly
every discussion of legal doctrine, whether the doctrine is gnarled or
straightforward. Yet we continue to avert our eyes. We repeat the old
pleasantries, and the legal myth persists.
This dynamic should help reduce concerns about the Enlightenment ideal as legal myth and highlight its strengths. Surely, we may
train an unhealthy amount of attention on the workings of the Supreme Court, and we may descend occasionally into the throngs of
legal nihilism. On the whole, however, faith in the presence of principle beneath our constitutional system has helped weather irrecon-
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If not, indeed, a descent into legal nihilism. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Players and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1984).
Consider, for example, the suspension of disbelief required for abolitionists and civilrights activists to struggle for a vision of the Constitution compromised by slavery and segregation.
See, e.g., “A man who lies to himself is blameworthy because he acts with knowledge of the
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cilable constitutional disagreements and maintained social confidence in a larger constitutional enterprise. It has done so even when
that faith is not quite warranted—even when our individual constitutional theories are recognizably inconsistent and our collective constitutional doctrine is recognizably incoherent. In this, there is reason to the apparent un-reason of the contradiction between the
Enlightenment ideal and common law culture, and there is reason to
the delusion that allows that contradiction to persist.
CONCLUSION
Suppose, then, that you have begun your descent from Sinai. I
have argued that you would be ill-advised to reveal the legal myth of
the Enlightenment ideal. If there is one legal myth that would be
best left unmentioned, perhaps there are more. Indeed, I have argued that the legal myth of the Enlightenment ideal obscures legal
myths that pervade all of our theories of constitutional interpretation.
Your views on this, of course, will depend on your view of the truth
about our constitutional enterprise and how that truth translates into
constitutional meaning. In this Article, I have necessarily made
claims about constitutional truth, though I have labored to make
those claims as minimal as possible. I have sought to avoid all claims
about constitutional meaning. It is you, after all, who is empowered
by the vision on Sinai. Or, if not by the vision on Sinai, some vision
nonetheless. Of course, your vision may cast doubt on my vision. To
this, I have no response. I can only hope that my limited vision can
withstand yours.
You may wonder why I would labor to expose a legal myth only to
argue that it remain unexposed. The importance of the Enlightenment ideal as legal myth does not depend upon a total lack of awareness. It depends on our collective persistence in leaving it generally
unacknowledged and unnoticed. This does not mean that constitutional theorists should wholly ignore it. In seeing the contradiction
between the common law culture and the Enlightenment ideal, the
constitutional theorist may grapple with how to address the dilemmas
of constitutional interpretation it circumscribes. Or, she may labor,
my views notwithstanding, to transform our constitutional order such
that it would hardly resemble our present order. Perhaps you find it
troubling that these two possibilities do not envision a collective constitutional conversation. This is natural. As I have argued, we value
both truth and obscurantism. It should not be surprising that both of
these forces would even shape how we address our engagement with
them.

